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[The king] has made Judges dependent on his Will alone for the
tenure of their offices, and the amount and payment of their
salaries.
The Declaration of Independence'
I. INTRODUCTION
In Anglo-American law, due process has always been understood to
require a trial before an impartial decision-maker. America's Founders
declared: "We hold these Truths to be self-evident, that all Men are created
equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable
Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness." 2
Similarly, the Constitution provides that "[n]o person shall be ... deprived
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." As the United
States Supreme Court recently observed: "A fair trial in a fair tribunal is a
basic requirement of due process."4
Due process traces all the way back to the Magna Carta.5 But what if
the judges presiding over cases are not impartial? What if they are
prejudiced, biased, perhaps related to one of the parties, or stand to gain
something from the court proceedings? Should the judges recuse
themselves? If they will not recuse, can they be challenged and
1. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 11 (U.S. 1776).
2. Id. pmbl. (emphasis added).
3. U.S. CONST. amend. V (emphasis added). The Fifth Amendment's due process protection
against the Federal Government is duplicated against the States, almost word for word, by the
Fourteenth Amendment. See id. amend. XIV, § 1. Throughout this Comment, "due process" refers
to the clause in the Fifth Amendment or the one in the Fourteenth Amendment, as applicable.
4. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2259 (2009) (quoting In re Murchison,
349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955)); see also infra notes 193-232 and accompanying text for further
discussion of Caperton.
5. See Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. 272, 276 (1855).
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disqualified? 6 All these questions are the domain of judicial disqualification
law, a legal field that is more than one thousand years old.7 It is a law that
has affected people from all walks of life, including monarchs. Shakespeare,
in his play Henry VIII, depicts the trial of Katharine of Aragon, Queen of
England and Henry's wife, in an ecclesiastical court presided by Cardinal
Wolsey.5  The Queen complains to Henry: "I am a most poor woman ...
/ ... having here / No judge indifferent... ."9 She does not accept Cardinal
Wolsey as her judge, on account of their enmity:
I do believe,
Induc'd by patent circumstances, that
You are mine enemy, and make my challenge.
You shall not be my judge. For it is you
Have blown this coal betwixt my lord and me
Which God's dew quench, therefore I say again
I utterly abhor; yea, from my soul
Refuse you for my judge, whom yet once more
I hold my most malicious foe, and think not
At all a friend to truth.10
After the Cardinal's rebuttal, she insists: "I do refuse you for my judge, and
here / Before you all, appeal unto the Pope / To bring my whole cause 'fore
his holiness / And to be judg'd by him."" And then she leaves the court.
After an initial consideration, the ecclesiastical court refuses to proceed in
the Queen's absence, considering that she had successfully asserted that she
did not have "fair and impartial judges." 2 Four hundred years later, we still
6. "Recusal" is customarily used to signify the judge's decision to stand down voluntarily,
while "disqualification" is used to describe the constitutionally or statutorily required removal of a
judge, initiated by one of the parties in litigation. See RICHARD E. FLAMM, JUDICIAL
DISQUALIFICATION: RECUSAL AND DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGES § 1.1, at 3 (2d ed. 2007); see also
Forrest v. State, 904 So. 2d 629, 629 n.l (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005). In this Comment, these terms
are used interchangeably.
7. See infra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
8. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, KING HENRY THE EIGHTH, act 2, sc. 4.
9. Id.
10. Id. The Queen is accusing Wolsey of having a personal grudge against her and, thus, being
unfit to judge her.
11. Id. Queen Katharine's demand could be interpreted, through our time's lens, as both a
request for an alternate (and presumably impartial) judge as well as an "interlocutory appeal" to the
ecclesiastical "Supreme Court" of the time, the Pope.
12. Harrington Putnam, Recusation, 9 CORNELL L. Q. 1, 6 (1923). This statement is based not on
Shakespeare's play but on historical accounts of the Queen's trial. Id at 6 n.20.
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have concerns about judges' impartiality. How can they be disqualified, if
needed?
Part II of this Comment surveys the history of disqualification law from
its early beginnings, through the English common law, to modem American
standards.13 This study highlights the well-known underlying structural
tension in a constitutional democracy-between the rule of law and the rule
of the people-as well as its consequence: the tension between judicial
impartiality and judicial accountability.14 Part III expounds on the current
state of recusal law in the states as well as in the federal judiciary.' 5 A brief
consideration of the ABA's Model Code of Judicial Conduct16 is followed
by references to recusal statutory and case law in the fifty states and the
District of Columbia." The federal disqualification statutes are discussed.' 8
The most significant United States Supreme Court disqualification
jurisprudence is then analyzed,'9 together with the recusal practices of the
justices in the modern era.20 Part IV makes the argument for reforning the
law of judicial disqualification, both state and federal. 2' The need for
recusal reform is presented in detail and several solutions are proposed.
Part V succinctly concludes this Comment. Finally, a concise review of the
disqualification laws in the fifty states and the District of Columbia is
provided in the Appendix.
II. HISTORY OF JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION
A. Early Beginnings
The notion of fairness in judicial proceedings can be traced back to
Roman times. Roman law provided that parties were allowed to disqualify a
judge who was "under suspicion" as long as they did so before the case went
to trial.23 Similarly, early Jewish law codified the rule that a judge was
disqualified from a case in which a party was a kinsman, a friend, or an
13. See infra notes 23-83 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 39-83 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 84-260 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 84-102 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 103-12 and accompanying text; see also Appendix infra notes 382-641.
18. See infra notes 113-47 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 148-239 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 240-60 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 261-381 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 276-381 and accompanying text.
23. CORPUS JURIS CIVILIS, CODEX, lib. 3, tit. 1, no. 16, as trans. in Putnam, supra note 12, at 3
n. 10 ("Although a judge has been appointed by imperial power, yet because it is our pleasure that all
litigations should proceed without suspicion, let it be permitted to him, who thinks the judge under
suspicion, to recuse him before issue joined.").
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enemy. 24 While civil law countries, in general, still follow such expansive
disqualification privileges, 25 English common law ultimately went in the
opposite direction.
B. Common Law and English Courts
In the thirteenth century, the great English jurist, Henry of Bracton,
favored (much like the earlier Roman scholars) a broad view of
disqualification-one that allowed litigants to remove a judge based on mere
suspicion of bias.26  Over time this changed considerably. In the
seventeenth century, Sir Edward Coke, Chief Justice of England's Court of
Common Pleas, decreed that "no man shall be a judge in his own case,"
where "own case" was taken to mean "direct financial interest." 27 While a
juror would be disqualified by certain categories of familial relationships, a
judge would not be.28 Old English statutes had recognized one additional
ground for disqualification: judges could not try cases in the county of their
birth, but these statutes had been repealed by 1739.29 By the mid-eighteenth
century, Lord Blackstone's now famous commentary, "[T]he law will not
suppose a possibility of bias or favour in a judge, who is already sworn to
administer impartial justice, and whose authority greatly depends upon that
presumption,"3o settled the matter for English jurisprudence. Thus, unlike
civil law countries, in the English courts at the time of America's founding,
a judge could only be disqualified for a direct pecuniary interest in the case,
and not for bias, perceived bias, or any other mere basis for suspicion."
24. THE CODE OF MAIMONIDES (MISHNEH TORAH): BOOK XIV, THE BOOK OF JUDGES, ch. 23,
68-70 (Abraham M. Hershman trans., Yale Univ. Press 1949); see also FLAMM, supra note 6, § 1.2,
at 5 n.2.
25. Putnam, supra note 12, at 1-9, 14.
26. 6 HENRY BRACTON, DE LEGIBUS ET CONSUETUDINIBUS ANGLIAE 249 (Travers Twiss ed.,
1883) ("A justiciary may be refused for good cause, but the only cause for refusal is a suspicion,
which arises from many causes, as if the judge be a blood relative of the plaintiff, . .. his parent or
friend, . . . his kinsman or a member of his household, or a table-companion, or he has been his
counsellor or his pleader in that cause or in another, and in any such like capacity."); see also
FLAMM, supra note 6, § 1.2, at 5, n.5.
27. Dr. Bonham's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 646, 652 (K.B. 1609) (ruling by Lord Coke that members
of a board that determined physicians' qualifications could not impose fines and receive those fines);
see also John P. Frank, Disqualification ofJudges, 56 YALE L.J. 605, 610 (1947).
28. Brookes v. Rivers, 145 Eng. Rep. 569 (Ex. 1668) (a judge was not disqualified from
presiding over his brother-in-law's case because "favour shall not be presumed in a judge"); see also
FLAMM, supra note 6, § 1.2, at 6, n.8.
29. FLAMM, supra note 6, § 1.2, at 7.
30. 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 361; see also FLAMM, supra note 6, § 1.2, at 6
n.7.
31. FLAMM, supra note 6, § 1.2, at 6; see also Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 543 (1994)
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This practice was closely mirrored in the thirteen American colonies.32
Dramatic changes came about with the introduction, in the 1800s, of an
American innovation: judicial elections.
C. American Innovation: Judicial Elections and the Need for More
Disqualification Grounds
In the American colonies, direct financial interest in the case at bar was
the only accepted reason for disqualifying a judge,33 and this practice
continued in all the states after independence.34 All the original thirteen
states had an appointive process for judicial selection." The Constitution
also provided for federal judges to be appointed. This state of affairs
favored judicial independence from the electorate.37 That changed
dramatically when Jacksonian-style Democracy swept the states-starting
with Mississippi in 1832-bringing about statewide judicial elections.
In any constitutional democracy there is a structural tension between
constitutionalism (the rule of law) and democracy (the rule of the people, the
rule of the majority).39 In the judicial sphere, this translates into the tension
between two well-established principles of the American polity: judicial
independence and public accountability.40 Judicial independence is
("Required judicial recusal for bias did not exist in England at the time of Blackstone.").
32. See Frank, supra note 27, at 609.
33. See, e.g., In re Dodge & Stevenson Mfg. Co., 77 N.Y. 101 (1879); see also Michael Nevels,
Bias and Interest: Should They Lead to Dissimilar Results in Judicial Qualification Practice?, 27
ARIz. L. REV. 171 (1985).
34. See Idaho v. Freeman, 507 F. Supp. 706 (D. Idaho 1981).
35. Jona Goldschmidt, Merit Selection: Current Status, Procedures, and Issues, 49 U. MIAMI L.
REv. 1, 5 (1994). In eight states, the legislature appointed the judges; in three states, the
appointments were jointly made by the governor and a council; in the remaining two states, the
governor made the appointments subject to a council's confirmation. Id.
36. U.S. CONST. art. III. "[lIndependence of the judges is ... requisite to guard the Constitution
and the rights of individuals . . . ." THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 527 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E.
Cooke ed., 1961).
37. While independent from the electorate, judges were-directly or indirectly-at the political
whim of legislatures. See Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Justiciability and Separation of Powers: A Neo-
Federalist Approach, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 393, 407-12 (1996).
38. See Goldschmidt, supra note 35, at 5. It really began with Georgia localities in 1789 and
Vermont localities in 1793. See Roy A. Schotland, New Challenges to States 'Judicial Selection, 95
GEO. L.J. 1077, 1093 (2007). Outside the United States, judicial elections are used only in a few
Swiss cantons and for the retention of the Japanese High Court. See Herbert M. Kritzer, Law Is the
Mere Continuation of Politics by Different Means: American Judicial Selection in the Twenty-First
Century, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 423, 431 (2007); see also Hans A. Linde, Elective Judges: Some
Comparative Comments, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1995, 1996 (1988) ("To the rest of the world, the
American adherence to judicial elections is as incomprehensible as our rejection of the metric
system."). For a thorough discussion ofjudicial elections in the "new era," see David E. Pozen, The
Irony ofJudicial Elections, 108 COLUM. L. REv. 265 (2008).
39. See Steven P. Croley, The Majoritarian Difficulty: Elective Judiciaries and the Rule ofLaw,
62 U. CHI. L. REV. 689, 701-06 (1995).
40. Pozen, supra note 38, at 271-72.
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important when "[w]e want judges to uphold the rule of law, to check the
excesses of the legislature and the executive, and to protect constitutional
rights and deep-seated values against majority encroachments," but "we also
want judges to be deferential to the 'political' branches and to administer
faithfully the laws on the books," which can only be insured through
accountability.4 1 Judicial elections were, and are, paramount to those
demanding judicial accountability to the public. 42 Elected judges are more
accountable and less independent than their appointed counterparts because
a Damocles' sword looms over their heads-they can be voted out of office.
Consciously or subconsciously, the elected judge's thought processes could
be affected by that political pressure, resulting in a skewed jurisprudence
and, maybe, a warped appreciation of the judiciary's proper function in
society.43 This is the essence of "the majoritarian difficulty,"" which is the
concern that elected judges are overly influenced by the views of the
many-the future voters. 45  Additionally, there is the potential for
favoritism, which is the concern that elected judges are overly influenced by
the views of the few-the campaign supporters.46
By the 1860s, twenty-two of thirty-four states had judicial elections.47
Party machines controlled the judicial selection process. 48 Abuses of this
politicized process were soon evident and, by the 1900s, the Progressive
movement suggested replacing judicial elections with an appointive system
based on merit.49 In 1914, Northwestern University's Professor Albert M.
Kales proposed that a non-political commission create a short list of judicial
nominees, and after a judge was appointed from this short list and served for
a particular period, he or she would run unopposed in a "retention"
election.o With slight modification, this plan was adopted by Missouri in
1940 and thereafter became known as the Missouri Plan.' Today more than
fifteen different judicial selection systems exist in the United States.5 2 All of
them are attempts to balance the competing interests of judicial
41. Id. at 272.
42. See Schotland, supra note 38, at 1086.
43. See Pozen, supra note 38, at 289.
44. See generally Croley, supra note 39; see also infra note 55, at 739 (the "crocodile-in-the-
bathtub" analogy).
45. Pozen, supra note 38, at 320.
46. Id.
47. See Goldschmidt, supra note 35, at 5.
48. Id. at 6.
49. Id. at 8.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 20.
52. See Schotland, supra note 38, at 1084.
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independence and judicial accountability to the people, and are combinations
and variations of the appointment system, of the partisan election system,
and of the Missouri Plan.
The tension between judicial independence and accountability to the
public is well-portrayed in the following exchange that took place between
several Justices in Republican Party of Minnesota v. White.5 ' In his dissent,
Justice Stevens remarked "[t]here is a critical difference between the work of
the judge and the work of other public officials... . [T]he elected judge ...
does not serve a constituency while holding that office." 54 Concurring
Justice O'Connor replied that elected judges are well-aware of consequences
in future elections if there is public dissatisfaction with their decisions,55 and
she expressed her concern that "relying on campaign donations may leave
judges feeling indebted to certain parties or interest groups."s6 In her
dissent, Justice Ginsburg agreed with Justice Stevens that judges must
"neutrally apply[] legal principles, and, when necessary, 'stand[] up to what
is generally supreme in a democracy: the popular will.' 57  Several years
later, after resigning from the bench, Justice O'Connor issued this stem
admonition: "In too many states, judicial elections are becoming political
prizefights where partisans and special interests seek to install judges who
will answer to them instead of the law and the Constitution."58  This
statement nicely captures the current situation.
Judicial elections (whether partisan elections or retention ones) have
sometimes yielded strange results:
[B]ecause judicial races rarely attract media attention, voters depend
heavily on party cues if available, bought advertising, and/or
candidates' names. Whatever one's view of name familiarity in
elections generally, in judicial elections they are often the entire
game because these candidates have such low visibility. For
53. 536 U.S. 765 (2002). For a case summary, see infra notes 179-92 and accompanying text.
54. White, 536 U.S. at 798-99 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
55. Id. at 789 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor indirectly quotes former California
Supreme Court Justice Otto Kaus, who said that "ignoring the political consequences of visible
decisions is 'like ignoring a crocodile in your bathtub."' Julian N. Eule, Crocodiles in the Bathtub:
State Courts, Voter Initiatives and the Threat of Electoral Reprisal, 65 U. COLO. L. REv. 733, 739
(1994). Justice Kaus made that remark one year before California Chief Justice Bird and two of her
colleagues were denied retention. See Schotland, supra note 38, at 1099-100 (2007). The
California trio was defeated-the first ever such defeats in California Supreme Court history-after
the Justices were attacked for their low rates of affirming death penalty cases. See B. Michael Dann
& Randall M. Hansen, Judicial Retention Elections, 34 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 1429, 1431-33 (2001).
56. White, 536 U.S. at 790 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
57. Id. at 804 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Ironically, Justice Ginsburg is quoting Justice Antonin
Scalia's own words back to him. See Antonin Scalia, The Rule ofLaw as a Law ofRules, 56 U. CHI.
L. REv. 1175, 1180 (1989).
58. Money & Elections, JUSTICE AT STAKE, http://www.justiceatstake.org/issues/statecourt
issues/money__elections.cfm (last visited Mar. 18, 2011).
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example, in last year's California's June primary, 20-year veteran
judge Dzintra Janavs ("particularly vulnerable-and even [perhaps]
targeted-because of her unusual name") lost to bagel shop owner
Lynn Diane Olson. While Janavs was a leader in complex litigation
and endorsed by the district attorney, sheriff, county supervisors,
and 18 sitting judges, Olson self-funded her campaign with
$100,000 for "slate mailers" and had only reactivated her bar
membership the year before (she had practiced for four years more
than a decade earlier). In 1990, in Washington State, highly
regarded Chief Justice Keith Callow lost to an unknown Tacoma
lawyer who did not campaign and spent only $500, but had the
same name as a Tacoma TV news anchorman. That same year, in
San Antonio, a judge so highly regarded that he was supported by
both sides of a divisive tort-law battle was defeated for a supreme
court nomination by a lawyer new to the area-a recent retiree from
the Army whose name was Gene Kelly. And in 1982, an Alabama
Supreme Court primary was narrowly won by incumbent Oscar
Adams, the state's first black justice, beating a three-year
practitioner from an unaccredited law school who had the same
name as a well-known local baking company. The Justice said:
"Our surveys showed a substantial number favored [my opponent]
because they thought he was the bakery man."
With such results, even the most honest judges might feel the need to raise
and spend significant campaign funds. Money has come to play a big role in
judicial elections, and overall spending has increased. In 2002, Ohio's high
court elections were unusually heated, prompting Ohio Supreme Court Chief
Justice Moyer to say afterwards: "Candidates were outraged. Citizens were
outraged. I am outraged. Anybody who places their trust and confidence in
a constitutional democracy should be outraged. We have been subjected to
the dark side of democracy. . . .,,60 In 2004, for the forty-nine seats in play
in sixteen states (not counting retention elections), candidates spent $46.8
million, while non-candidates contributed an additional $12 million.6' But
how will a judges react when a campaign donor shows up in their court?
What kind of protection does a litigant have against such a donor in a trial
presided by the donee? A judge presiding in a case for a previous
contributor was not seen as having a direct financial interest in the matter
59. See Schotland, supra note 38, at 1092-93.
60. Id. at 1080. Ohio Chief Justice Moyer was reacting to the virulent ads by non-candidate
groups on both sides. Id.
6 1. Id.
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and could not be disqualified unless novel grounds for disqualification were
allowed.62 The evolving recusal law has provided such new bases.
D. Evolution of the Modern Disqualification Standard
Early in the twentieth century, in a legal dispute between two Montana
copper companies, a judge favoring one of the companies issued an
injunction against the other. When the losing party asked for the judge's
disqualification, the state supreme court refused to do so, noting the absence
of disqualification grounds related to bias or prejudice. 4  Montana's
legislature quickly enacted a law that overturned this decision and permitted
judges to be disqualified for bias or prejudice.s More recently, doubts
about the suitability of a judge to preside over certain cases have been
expressed in two notable instances: first, during the congressional hearings
for Justice Samuel Alito's confirmation; and second, when former House
Minority Leader Tom DeLay secured the disqualification of a Texas judge,
who was about to preside over DeLay's criminal trial, because the judge
contributed to MoveOn.org, an organization that disparaged DeLay.66
Scholars and judges alike have, for a long time, endorsed even stricter
standards than bias.
Congress and state legislatures took action. Although the 1792 version
of the federal statute required disqualification only for interest, for acting in
the matter, or for having been of counsel in the case, Congress
subsequently amended the statute and added new disqualification bases,68
most notably that "impartiality might reasonably be questioned."69  State
courts followed the lead, eager to assure litigants and the public that courts
were impartial.70 A few states, mostly in the West and Midwest, have added
62. See supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text.
63. See Frank, supra note 27, at 608 n.8.
64. State ex rel. Anaconda Copper-Mining Co. v. Dist. Court, 76 P. 1133 (Mont. 1903).
65. See Frank, supra note 27, at 608 n.8.
66. FLAMM, supra note 6, § 1.5, at 11.
67. Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 36, § 11, 1 Stat. 275, 278-79.
68. Act of Mar. 3 1821, ch. 51, 3 Stat. 643 (if, in the judge's opinion, the judge is so related or
connected to a party as to render a decision improper, the judge should recuse); Act of Mar. 1891,
ch. 517, § 3, 26 Stat. 826, 827 (a judge may not hear an appeal of a case he tried); see also 28 U.S.C.
§ 47 (2006); Act of Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 23, § 21, 36 Stat. 1087, 1090 (a judge is disqualified when a
party files a sufficient affidavit of bias).
69. Act of Dec. 5, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-512, 88 Stat. 1609 (codified as 28 U.S.C. §§ 47, 144,
455 (2006)) (among other provisions, judges are disqualified when their impartiality might
reasonably be questioned); see infra notes 113-47 and accompanying text.
70. See, e.g., People v. Dist. Court, 560 P.2d 828 (Colo. 1977); Johnson v. Dist. Court, 674 P.2d
952 (Colo. 1984); Tennant v. Marion Health Care Found., Inc., 459 S.E.2d 374, 384 (W. Va. 1995)
("The legal system will endure only so long as members of society ... believe that our courts
endeavor to provide ... unbiased forums in which justice may be found and done."); see also
FLAMM, supra note 6, § 1.4, at 9.
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peremptory challenges," which allow a party to remove a judge from the
case without having to show good cause, bias, prejudice, or appearance of
impropriety. For its part, the ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct has
required-since the first version came out in 1924 under the guidance of
Chief Justice (and former President) Taft-that judges avoid impropriety,
and the appearance of impropriety as well.72 It was a subjective standard at
first, and judges decided for themselves if recusal was needed." In the
1970s the standard changed to an objective one-the reasonable person
standard-and in 1990 the language again changed to make clear the
mandatory nature of the provision.74 But even such novel bases for
disqualification can be ineffective because in most states judges still rule on
their own challenges, and in all jurisdictions it is difficult to remove a judge
for having received support from a party (financial or otherwise), for bias,
prejudice, or appearance thereof.75
In the majority of jurisdictions there is no constitutional ground to
disqualify a judge, unless one is implicitly read in the right to fair trial, and
even then it would require actual bias, not merely its appearance.76 It is thus
not surprising that, looking for a pervasive solution to all these issues,
litigants have turned to the United States Constitution's Due Process Clause
as a last resort against federal and state courts' decisions. More recently,
parties have made bold assertions that judicial elections, in themselves, exert
such influence on judges that they violate the Due Process Clause. 8 In
71. See, e.g., Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 170.6 (West, Westlaw through all 2010 Reg. Sess. Laws; all
2009-2010 through 8th Exec. Sess. Laws; and all Props. on 2010 ballots); Or. Rev. Stat. § 14.250
(West, Westlaw through 2010 Special Sess. Laws); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 801.58 (West, Westlaw
through 2009 Act 406). But see Wamser v. State, 587 P.2d 232 (Alaska 1978) (common law did not
have peremptory challenges, and most states and federal courts do not allow it).
72. See M. Margaret McKeown, Don't Shoot the Canons: Maintaining the Appearance of
Propriety Standard, 7 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 45, 46, nn.1 1 & 14 (2005).
73. Id. at 46-47.
74. Id. at 47.
75. Pozen, supra note 38, at 291.
76. See, e.g., State v. Hollingsworth, 467 N.W.2d 555, 560 (Wis. Ct. App. 1991) (only actual
unfair treatment of litigant deprives a party of the fundamental fairness constitutional guarantee;
appearance of bias or speculation as to the judge's bias does not); see also Margoles v. Johns, 660
F.2d 291 (7th Cir. 1981); cf ARK. CONST., art VII, § 20; N.H. CONsT., pt. 1, art. 35, § 18; TENN.
CONST., art. 6, § 11 (disqualification provisions are explicit).
77. See, e.g., Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927). See infra notes 148-57 and accompanying
text for further discussion of Tumey.
78. See, e.g., Brief Amicus Curiae of the Idaho Conservation League and the Louisiana
Environmental Action Network in Support of Neither Side at 24-30, Republican Party of Minn. v.
White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002) (No. 01-521) (asserting that "[s]tate judicial election procedures violate
litigants' rights under the Due Process Clause to have their cases heard by fair and impartial
courts"); see also Stephen B. Bright & Patrick J. Keenan, Judges and the Politics ofDeath: Deciding
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2004, The Washington Post published an article discussing then-recently
decided elections for the West Virginia Supreme Court.79  The article
highlighted that Don Blankenship, chief executive of Massey Energy Co.,
contributed $1.7 million out of the total $2.5 million raised to elect the new
Justice Brent Benjamin.so Massey Energy Co., the coal company, was
expected to appeal several cases before the state supreme court.8 ' Through
his campaign spokesman, Justice Benjamin vowed to consider motions to
"recuse himself in cases involving Blankenship and his company." 82 His
later decision to renege on this promise and preside over cases involving
Massey Energy Co. is what led directly to the Court's recent decision in
Caperton 8 -ultimately defining the role of the federal Constitution's Due
Process Clause in the judicial disqualification arena. Notwithstanding issues
of federalism, Caperton has the potential to radically change the current
state of the law.
III. CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW
A. The Model Code ofJudicial Conduct
The Canons of the first Model Code of Judicial Conduct were adopted
in 1924.84 The ABA was reacting to the conflict of interest created by
Kenesaw Mountain Landis who was both a federal judge and the
Commissioner of the Major League Baseball Association." There were
Between the Bill offRights and the Next Election in Capital Cases, 75 B.U. L. REV. 759, 822 (1995)
(arguing that constitutional due process implies that "judges should be disqualified from presiding
over cases in which there is the appearance that political considerations could tempt judges in their
rulings"); Martin H. Redish & Lawrence C. Marshall, Adjudicatory Independence and the Values of
Procedural Due Process, 95 YALE L.J. 455, 498 (1986) ("[I]n cases involving the assertion of a
liberty or property interest in which the state is a party, the use of non-tenured state judges seems to
be a clear violation of procedural due process.").
79. Carol Morello, W. Va. Supreme Court Justice Defeated in Rancorous Contest, WASH. POST,




83. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009). See infra notes 193-232 and
accompanying text for further discussion of Caperton.
84. See McKeown, supra note 72, at 46. The ABA Code of Judicial Conduct has been adopted,
partially or in its entirety, by most states and the District of Columbia. See Stuart Banner, Note,
Disqualifying Elected Judges from Cases Involving Campaign Contributors, 40 STAN. L. REv. 449,
468 n.102 (1988). The Judicial Conference of the United States also adopted (in 1973) the ABA
Code, with only minor changes, as the standard for the conduct of all federal judges except Justices
of the United States Supreme Court. Id. The United States Supreme Court is not under the
jurisdiction of the Judicial Conference. Id.
85. See McKeown, supra note 72, at 46. Judge Landis was working to clean up the betting
scandal involving the Chicago White Sox. See JOHN P. MACKENZIE, THE APPEARANCE OF JUSTICE
180-82 (1974).
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thirty-four canons, and they included both impropriety and its appearance86
as subjective standards. In 1972, the objective standard was introduced
("impartiality might reasonably be questioned"),88 and in 1990 "should" was
replaced with "shall" in all the canons and rules, making the Model Code
mandatory.89 Rule 2.11 provides the reasons for disqualifying a judge:
personal knowledge of disputed facts in the proceeding or likelihood of
being a material witness, relationship to the parties or their lawyers, bias or
prejudice, economic interest in the matter, 90 being a party in the proceeding,
parties or their lawyers having contributed to the judge's campaign, 9' the
judge having made public statements committing or appearing to commit the
judge to a certain outcome in the current proceeding,92 and other grounds.
Most of the Model Code's provisions are also found in 28 U.S.C. § 455, one
of the federal disqualification statutes. 94
The Model Code has had its fair share of criticism, and its "appearance
of impropriety" standard has been perceived as imprecise and difficult to
implement.95 Critics fear that vague standards could lead to politically-
based prosecutions of judges.96 It is also seen as promoting the idea that in
order to prevent judges from behaving unethically, they must be prevented
from appearing to behave unethically; the more time judges spend avoiding
the appearances of impropriety, the less they spend on "real ethical
pitfalls."9 The standard's supporters point out that (1) appearance of
impropriety and impropriety are not mutually exclusive, (2) appearance
could be just as important as real bias, and (3) the Canons inspire
86. The old Canon 4 read: "A judge's official conduct should be free from impropriety and the
appearance of impropriety." MACKENZIE, supra note 85, at 190.
87. See McKeown, supra note 72, at 46-47.
88. SUSAN R. MARTYN ET AL., THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS: NATIONAL RULES,
STANDARDS, STATUTES, AND STATE LAWYER CODES, 329 (2009).
89. See id at 318; see also McKeown, supra note 72, at 47.
90. The interest must be more than de minimis but applies to the judges and their relatives to the
third degree. See MARTYN ET AL., supra note 88, at 328-29.
91. If the contributions are more than a certain amount, as individuals or as part of an entity, in
one contribution, or in the aggregate over a number of certain years. Id. at 325.
92. The statements must be other than those made by the judge in a court proceeding or judicial
decision or opinion. Id.
93. For a comprehensive list of disqualification reasons, see id at 328-29.
94. See infra notes 113-28 and accompanying text.
95. Leonard Post, ABA's Judicial Conduct Proposals Draw Fire, NATL. L.J. 1, (Feb. 24, 2005),
available at http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1109128219258&hbxlogin=1 (last visited Mar.
18, 2011).
96. Id.
97. Alex Kozinski, The Real Issues ofJudicial Ethics, 32 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1095, 1105 (2004).
98. McKeown, supra note 72, at 52. If the judge "sport[s] a 'Hang 'em high' or 'Save the
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confidence in the judiciary.99  Several state chief justices see the
"appearance of impropriety" standard as both "a structure for imposing
discipline" and as "a guide to how judges should conduct themselves."'
The "reasonable person" standard of the Model Code has also been
criticized:
[A]n appearance test shifts attention away from what objections are
valid to what objections might appear valid to a reasonable observer
who has not wrestled with the problem. The reasonable person may
be a better guide for driving a car than the thinking judge, but not
for deciding whether it is unjust for a judge to hear a case. The
appearance test invites judges to rest on appearances, instead of
looking deeper. 1o
It is particularly the combination of the "reasonable person" standard and
self-judging of recusal motions that some scholars view as failing to keep
judicial discretion in check. 102 It is a valid point, but recusal reform may be
able to address it.
B. State Disqualification Law
It is useful, at this point, to get a quick overview of the disqualification
laws in the states. A concise review of it, in the fifty states and the District
of Columbia, is provided in the Appendix.103 State recusal law takes the
form of constitutional provisions, court rules, and statutes." There are
relevant differences, however. Most importantly, a significant minority of
states have adopted statutes or court rules that allow disqualification
peremptorily, while in the majority of states judges can only be disqualified
Whales' shirt," judicial impartiality is undermined not because of actual bias but because of the
appearance of bias. Id
99. Id This confidence in the judiciary is also important for the Supreme Court and it is at the
very heart of federal recusal statutes. Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847,
864-65 (1988). As Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote:
Disputes arousing deep passions often come to the courtroom, and justice may appear
imperfect to parties and their supporters disappointed by the outcome. This we cannot
change. We can, however, enforce society's legitimate expectation that judges maintain,
in fact and appearance, the conviction and discipline to resolve those disputes with
detachment and impartiality.
Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 564 (1994).
100. Post, supra note 95.
101. John Leubsdorf, Theories of Judging and Judge Disqualification, 62 N.Y.U. L. REv. 237,
278 (1987).
102. Jeffrey M. Hayes, To Recuse or to Refuse: Self-Judging and the Reasonable Person Problem,
33 J. LEGAL PROF. 85, 101 (2008).
103. See Appendix infra notes 382-641 and accompanying text.
104. Delaware and New Hampshire are the exception-they do not have disqualification statutes.
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for cause. os Peremptory challenges augment the impartiality or appearance
thereof, by allowing parties to remove a judge without having to show bias
(or appearance of bias). 06 They also alleviate the risk of judicial retribution
following a failed attempt to remove a judge for cause. 07
When it comes to the reasons for recusal, twenty-four states allow it for
the appearance of impropriety (i.e., when the judge's impartiality might
reasonably be questioned), five require proof of actual bias,'o and the law is
unclear in the rest of the states.
The way the judges are selected also varies greatly within the nation.
Twelve states, and the District of Columbia, appoint their judges'09 (with
three of them following up with elections). Twelve states use a merit system
(with three of them following up with retention elections)."o Twenty states
use non-partisan elections (a few of them follow up with retention elections),
while eight use partisan elections (with Illinois alone following up with
retention elections)."' For comprehensive information regarding state law
governing judges, see the American Judicature Society's websites." 2
Federal law adds to this tapestry of American recusal law.
105. Seventeen states allow for peremptory disqualification (without cause); three states have
quasi-peremptory rules (the judge must recuse or transfer the recusal motion to another judge);
thirty-one states do not allow peremptory disqualification. See Appendix infra notes 382--641 and
accompanying text.
106. See, e.g., Turnipseed v. Truckee-Carson Irrigation Dist., 13 P.3d 395, 398 (Nev. 2000) ("The
right to peremptory challenge promotes judicial fairness by allowing a party to disqualify a judge
that it believes is unfair or biased.").
107. For a detailed treatment of the benefits and critiques of the peremptory challenge system,
including the constitutionality of peremptory challenges vis-A-vis separation of powers, see FLAMM,
supra note 6, §§ 26.1-26.2.
108. Arizona, Iowa, Louisiana, Michigan, and South Carolina require actual bias before a judge
needs to recuse. See Appendix infra notes 382-641 and accompanying text.
109. Massachusetts judges are appointed for life, with a mandatory retirement age of seventy. See
Methods of Judicial Selection, AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY, http:www.judicialselection.us/
judicial_selection/methods/selection of judges.cfm?state= (last visited Mar. 18, 2011).
110. Florida uses a merit system for its appellate courts but non-partisan elections for its trial
courts. Id.
111. See Appendix infra notes 382-641 and accompanying text.
112. AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY, http://www.ajs.org (last visited Feb. 18, 2011); Judicial
Selection in the States, http://www.judicialselection.us (last visited Feb. 18, 2011) [hereinafter AJS,
Judicial Selection].
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C. Federal Disqualification Law
1. 28 U.S.C. § 455
The first federal statute dealing with judicial recusal, 28 U.S.C. § 455,'1
dates back to 1792,114 and at that time it disqualified the judge only for
pecuniary interest or if the judge had acted in the proceeding or had been "of
counsel" for a party.' Congress amended the statute several times over the
following century, each time adding grounds for disqualification."l 6
Although the increase in bases for disqualification was modest, the statute's
real weakness was that the challenged judges themselves could decide on the
parties' motions." As amended by Congress in 1974," 8 the statute tracks
almost word for word the ABA Code of Judicial Conduct," 9 calling for
judicial disqualification whenever a judge's "impartiality might reasonably
be questioned," 20 while still enumerating specific circumstances for
disqualification.121 Importantly, the new law substituted the objective
"reasonable man" standard for the old subjective "in the opinion of the
judge" standard.122 Under Section 455(b), the judge must recuse himself if
the statutory criteria exist, even if no motion has been introduced, no
affidavit filed, and even if a reasonable person would not question the
judge's impartiality.123  Some federal courts have said that a Section 455
motion 24 should be decided by a judge other than the challenged judge, 25
while other courts have held that Section 455 motions may,126 should,' or
113. At the time this was called Section 20.
114. See Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 36, § 11, 1. Stat. 278.
115. Litekyv. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 544 (1994).
116. Act of Mar. 3, 1821, ch. 51, 3 Stat. 643; Act of Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 23, § 20, 36 Stat. 1090
(codified as 28 U.S.C. § 455 (2006)) (requiring a judge to disclose a conflict of interest, and
mandating disqualification when a judge is a material witness); see Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, §
455, 62 Stat. 908.
117. See, e.g., McGuire v. Blount, 199 U.S. 142, 143 (1905).
118. Act of December 5, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-512, 88 Stat. 1609.
119. ABA MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3(e) (1990). The ABA Code of Judicial
Conduct has been adopted, partially or in its entirety, by most states and the District of Columbia.
See supra note 84.
120. 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (2006).
121. See 28 U.S.C. § 455(b) (2006).
122. In re Acker, 696 F. Supp. 591, 595 (N.D. Ala. 1988).
123. See, e.g., United States v. Cerceda, 139 F.3d 847, 852-53 (1lth Cir. 1998); In re Bernard, 31
F.3d 842, 843, n.1 (9th Cir. 1994); United States v. Balistrieri, 779 F.2d 1191, 1202 (7th Cir. 1985).
124. For a comprehensive treatment of deciding Section 455 motions, see FLAMM, supra note 6, §
24.8, at 721.
125. See, e.g., Levitt v. Univ. of Tex. at El Paso, 847 F.2d 221, 226 (5th Cir 1988).
126. See, e.g., United States v. Conforte, 457 F. Supp. 641 (D. Nev. 1978).
127. See, e.g., United States v. Studley, 783 F.2d 934, 940 (9th Cir. 1986); In re Drexel Burnham
Lambert, Inc., 861 F.2d 1307, 1312 (2d Cir. 1988).
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must be decided by the challenged judge.12 8  Thus, Section 455 covers
appearance of bias and a specific list of conditions already deemed as
resulting from bias or prejudice.
2. 28 U.S.C. § 144
In 1911 Congress made significant changes to the statute,' 29 adding
Section 144,30 which prohibited a challenged judge to proceed further on
the recusal motion, and requiring that "another judge shall be designated" to
hear the matter.'3 1  Scholars argued that the language in Section 144132
clearly showed Congress's intention for it to be a peremptory challenge
statute. 133 The United States Supreme Court decided otherwise. In the first
case to interpret Section 144, Berger v. United States,134 the Court supported
the idea that a district judge may not pass judgment upon the truth of the
facts alleged in the disqualification affidavit (the judge had to accept the
party's allegations as true), but decided that the challenged judge could still
consider if the alleged facts (accepted as true) were legally sufficient for
disqualification. 135 Therefore, disqualification under Section 144 has never
been peremptory, although some courts have recognized it to be at least
"partially preemptory."136
Section 144 allows for disqualification based on bias or prejudice
alleged in an affidavit filed by a party, a reason that is not found on the list
of Section 455. Thus, the advantage of Section 144 is that the factual
allegations will be deemed true, while the major disadvantage is that the
challenged judge will decide if those facts are legally sufficient.3 7 Because
of the courts' strict construction of the statute's procedural requirements, 38
disqualification under Section 144 has been rare.139
128. See, e.g., United States v. Eisenberg, 734 F. Supp. 1137, 1157 (D.N.J. 1990); In re Moody,
58 B.R. 308 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1986).
129. See Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 544 (1994).
130. At the time this was called Section 21.
131. Act of Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 23, § 21, 36 Stat. 1090.
132. Act of May 24, 1949, Pub. L. No. 80-72, ch. 139, § 65, 63 Stat. 99.
133. See, e.g., Seth E. Bloom, Judicial Bias and Financial Interest as Grounds for
Disqualification ofFederal Judges, 35 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 662, 666 (1985).
134. 255 U.S. 22(1921).
135. Id; see also Fong v. Am. Air., Inc., 431 F. Supp. 1334, 1337 (N.D. Cal. 1977).
136. See Murray v. I.R.S., 923 F. Supp. 1289, 1292 (D. Idaho 1996).
137. Berger, 255 U.S. at 22, 32.
138. See United States v. Hines, 696 F.2d 722, 728 (10th Cir. 1982); see also Huff v. Std. Life Ins.
Co., 643 F. Supp. 705, 706-07 (S.D. Fla. 1986).
139. For an in-depth discussion of Section 144 motions, see FLAMM,supra note 6, §§ 23.3-23.7.
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3. Other Provisions of Federal Disqualification Law
A lesser known federal statute involving judicial disqualification is 28
U.S.C. § 47, which provides that "no judge shall hear or determine an appeal
from the decision of a case or issue tried by him."I 40 Although the statute's
language is quite specific, the term "appeal" has been supplemented by
several federal appellate circuits to include petitions of habeas corpus that
are entered before a judge who was previously involved at the trial level.141
4. Summary of Federal Disqualification Law
There are two main federal statutes regarding recusal: 28 U.S.C. § 144
and 28 U.S.C. § 455. 142 While they have significant overlap, they also have
major differences: (1) Section 144 is directed solely at actual bias, while
Section 455 also covers specific conflicts of interest and the appearance of
bias; (2) an affidavit is needed to invoke Section 144, but not to invoke
Section 455, which also mandates that judges recuse sua sponte; and (3)
Section 144 applies only to district court judges, while Section 455 extends
to "any justice, judge, or magistrate judge of the United States."1 43 The
courts added, as a common gloss to both Section 144 and Section 455, that
the source of bias must be an extrajudicial one.'" Although the extrajudicial
rule was developed only for Section 144,145 Liteky v. United States 46 settled
the matter and nowadays federal courts are unanimous in requiring that the
bias be extrajudicial no matter which disqualification statute applies.147
Due to the variety and strength of the disqualification options present in
federal statutes, and due to the Supreme Court's direct appellate power over
the lower federal courts, the Due Process clause will rarely (if at all) be
invoked in the federal system.
The Court's cases significantly augment our understanding of
disqualification law.
140. 28 U.S.C. § 47 (2006).
141. Clemmons v. Wolfe, 377 F.3d 322, 325-29 (3d. Cir. 2004) (also citing cases in the Fourth,
Sixth, and Seventh Circuit).
142. Fed. Judicial Ctr., Recusal: Analysis of Case Law Under 28 U.S.C. §§ 455 & 144, at 1
(2002), available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/recusal.pdfl$file/recusal.pdf.
143. 28 U.S.C. § 455 (2006); see Fed. Judicial Ctr., supra note 142, at 1.
144. The bias or prejudice must be personal and not arising from the judge's previous conduct in
the same case. See, e.g., Green v. Nevers, III F.3d 1295, 1303-04 (6th Cir. 1997); In re Grand Jury
Proceedings, 875 F.2d 927, 932 n.5 (1st Cir. 1989); In re Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., 861 F.2d
1307, 1314 (2d Cir. 1988); United States v. Page, 828 F.2d 1476, 1481 (10th Cir. 1987).
145. Alexander v. Chi. Park Dist., 773 F.2d 850, 856 (7th Cir. 1985).
146. 510 U.S. 540 (1994).
147. See In re Antar, 71 F.3d 97 (3d Cir. 1995).
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D. Supreme Court Cases
1. Tumey v. Ohio
Pursuant to an Ohio statute, Ed Tumey was arrested for illegal
possession of intoxicating liquor, brought before the mayor of an Ohio town,
tried, convicted, and fined by the same mayor, who then received
compensation for hearing the case (no compensation would be received for
an acquittal).148 The Ohio Supreme Court affirmed Tumey's conviction, and
he appealed to the United States Supreme Court.149
The Supreme Court started by declaring that not all matters regarding
judicial recusal rise to the level of a constitutional concern and that "matters
of kinship, personal bias, state policy, [and] remoteness of interest would
seem generally to be matters merely of legislative discretion."" 0 The Court
reiterated that the common law required disqualification, as a matter of due
process, only when the judge had a direct financial interest in the matter.' 5'
The Court found that to be the case in Tumey due to the fact that the mayor
would be paid only upon conviction and not upon acquittal. 52 Scholars
routinely quote the Court for what is now known to be the "hold the balance
nice, clear, and true" test:
There are doubtless mayors who would not allow such a
consideration ... to affect their judgment... , but the requirement
of due process of law in judicial procedure is not satisfied by the
argument that men of the highest honor and the greatest self-
sacrifice could carry it on without danger of injustice. Every
procedure which would offer a possible temptation to the average
man as a judge to forget the burden of proof required to convict the
defendant, or which might lead him not to hold the balance nice,
clear, and true between the state and the accused denies the latter
due process of law. '
Yet, it is largely ignored that the mayor's direct pecuniary interest was
not the only due process violation.154 The fact that the mayor occupied two
148. Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 515-20 (1927).
149. Id at 515.
150. Id at 523.
151. Id. at 523-25.




inconsistent positions, one executive and "partisan," and the other judicial,
had led Tumey to question whether he would get a fair trial before the
mayor, and it, necessarily, resulted in a lack of due process.'55 The Court
recognized that the legislature may vest such powers into one individual
(and dispose of the fees resultant) but held that such individual may be
disqualified from his judicial function if his dual responsibilities present him
with a "motive to convict," incongruent with a party's right to have an
impartial judge.'56  This "motive to convict" language combined with the
"possible temptation . . . not to hold the balance nice, clear, and true" test,
amounts to an "appearance of impropriety" reason for disqualification,
although the Court's opinion does not use that phrase.'" Forty-five years
later, in Ward v. Village of Monroeville,158 the Supreme Court upheld this
second disqualification principle from Tumey.
2. Ward v. Village of Monroeville
Much like the mayor in Tumey, the mayor of Monroeville, Ohio, could
act in a judicial capacity, and he did, fining Ward for two traffic
violations.'59 In 1972, the Monroeville mayor was responsible for law
enforcement and also for revenue production in the village, and a substantial
part of the village's income came from such fines as imposed on Ward,16
although unlike in Tumey, this mayor did not personally share in the fees and
costs.16' Nevertheless, the Supreme Court held that this was not a limitation
of the principle announced in Tumey,162 but was rather a similar "'situation
in which an official perforce occupies two practically and seriously
inconsistent positions, one partisan and the other judicial, (and) necessarily
involves a lack of due process of law in the trial of defendants charged with
crimes before him."" 6 3  Quite interesting is that the High Court also
dismissed an argument that Ward's rights were adequately protected by an
Ohio statute that provided disqualification for bias,' 6 as well as an
alternative argument that this issue can be corrected on appeal, or in a de
155. Id at 533-34.
156. Id. at 534.
157. The Tumey opinion was written by Chief Justice Taft three years after the publication-under
his guidance-of the first ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct, which included appearance of
impropriety as a reason for disqualification. See McKeown, supra note 72, 46-50 and
accompanying text.
158. 409 U.S. 57 (1972).
159. Id. at 57.
160. Id. at 58.
161. Id. at 62 (White, J. & Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
162. Id. at 60 (majority opinion).
163. Id. (quoting Tumey, 273 U.S. at 534).
164. Id at 61 ("[Tlhe [Ohio] statute requires too much and protects too little.").
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novo trial, back in the Ohio courts. 6 5
3. In re Murchison
In 1955, a judge acting under Michigan law as a "one-man grand
jury interrogated policeman Murchison in a secret hearing and,
convinced that Murchison had committed perjury, charged him and, in a
subsequent public proceeding, convicted and sentenced him for criminal
contempt.' 67 The Supreme Court found it to be a due process violation for
the same judge who acted as a one-man grand jury (and interrogated the
contemnor) to also preside over the contempt trial.'68  Although factually
very different from Tumey, the Supreme Court based its decision on the
same test: "'[E]very procedure which would offer a possible temptation to
the average man as a judge [which might lead him] not to hold the balance
nice, clear and true between the State and the accused, denies the latter due
process of law.""'69  The Court stated once more that basic due process
requires a fair trial before a fair court, and then expanded on the idea by
declaring that our legal system has always sought to remove even the
probability of unfairness.170
Speaking for the Court, Justice Black recast the old English legal
maxim-no man should be a judge in his own case-into "no man is
permitted to try cases where he has an interest in the outcome."' 7' To
discover and characterize such interest, relationships and circumstances must
be examined 72 and, while this may sometimes disqualify judges who have
no actual bias and who would strive to be impartial, "'justice must satisfy
the appearance of justice"' if it is to "perform its high function in the best
way." "
165. Id. (stating that "the State's trial court procedure [may not] be deemed constitutionally
acceptable simply because the State eventually offers a defendant an impartial adjudication"
(emphasis added)).
166. In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 133 (1955).
167. Id at 134-35.
168. Id. at 139.




173. Id (citing Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954), a case that had presented an almost
identical situation to the one in Murchison, albeit in a federal district court).
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4. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie
In 1986, in Lavoie, a justice on the Supreme Court of Alabama had cast
the deciding vote upholding a jury verdict (including a $3.5 million punitive
award) against an insurance company, during the time that the same justice
had an ongoing case pending against a different insurer, but for the same
legal matter.174 The United States Supreme Court answered the allegation of
actual bias and prejudice by stating that only in extreme circumstances
would the Due Process Clause be triggered by such bases of
disqualification.'15  However, the Court found a due process violation
existed based on its finding of interest in the outcome of the case by the
Alabama justice. 176 The Court's opinion did not decide whether the
Alabama justice was actually biased; it only considered whether there was a
"possible temptation. . . not to hold the balance nice, clear and true."177
Most importantly, the High Court framed the relationship between the Due
Process Clause and disqualification law:
[OJur decision today undertakes to answer only the question of
under what circumstances the Constitution requires disqualification.
The Due Process Clause demarks only the outer boundaries of
judicial disqualifications. Congress and the states, of course,
remain free to impose more rigorous standards for judicial
disqualification than those we find mandated here today.178
This framework would be used later in deciding White'79 and Caperton.80
5. Republican Party ofMinnesota v. White
Minnesota has selected its judges through elections since its statehood in
1858, and the elections have been non-partisan since 1912.181 In 1974, the
Minnesota Supreme Court promulgated a rule-known as the "announce
clause"-that prohibited candidates running in judicial elections from
putting forward their views on disputed legal and political matters.182 A
lawyer, running for a seat on the Minnesota Supreme Court, distributed
174. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 816-17 (1986).
175. Id at 821.
176. Id. at 825.
177. Id. (quoting Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 532 (1927)).
178. Id at 828.
179. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002).
180. Caperton v. Massey, 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009).
181. White, 536 U.S. at 768.
182. Id. The rule was based on the Minnesota Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 5(A)(3)(d)(i)
(2000), which was, in turn, based on Canon 7(B) of the 1972 American Bar Association (ABA)
Model Code of Judicial Conduct.
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information criticizing sitting Minnesota justices for their decisions on
crime, abortion, and welfare. 83 Although a complaint against him with the
state bar was dismissed, the lawyer withdrew from the campaign fearing the
loss of his license to practice law.'84 The lawyer ran again in a subsequent
election and, after asking for an advisory opinion from the state bar
regarding the constitutionality of the announce clause, he filed a suit in
federal district court asking for a declaratory judgment that the announce
clause was in violation of his First Amendment rights.' Writing for a 5-4
majority, Justice Scalia considered history, the tension between competing
democratic principles, and the definition of "impartiality."'8 He found that
the announce clause prohibited speech that belongs to the core of our First
Amendment freedoms and, as such, was subject to and failed the strict
scrutiny test, and therefore violated the First Amendment.'87 His passionate
opinion notwithstanding, Justice Scalia sharply stated that the case did not
stand for the proposition that judicial elections are or should be the same as
legislative elections.' 88 Justice O'Connor concurred in the opinion but wrote
separately to highlight her concerns about judicial elections.' 89 She wrote
that elected judges, when deciding cases, ignore the public at their own
(reelection) peril, and warned that judges could feel indebted to interest
groups.190 In his concurrence, Justice Anthony Kennedy joined the side bar
discussion pointing out that "[j]udicial integrity is . .. a state interest of the
highest order."' 9' Justices Stevens and Ginsburg filed dissents, each joined
by Justices Souter and Breyer, expounding on the (desired) neutrality of
judges, and their proper role in a democratic society.' 92
6. Caperton v. A. T. Massey Coal Co.
The facts in Caperton are worthy of a Hollywood script. Two West
Virginia mining companies took competition to a whole new level, and
when one of them, Massey, almost destroyed the other, Caperton, the latter
183. Id.
184. Id at 768-69. The State Bar regulatory body had expressed doubts about the
constitutionality of the announce clause. Id. at 769.
185. Id. at 769-70.
186. See id. at 774-88.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 783.
189. See id. at 788 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
190. Id. at 789-90.
191. Id. at 793 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
192. See id. at 797 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 803 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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sued for fraud and tortious interference with contractual relationships. 93 In
2002, a jury found for Caperton and awarded $50 million in damages
(compensatory and punitive).194 By 2005, the trial court had denied Massey
all post-trial motions and the case was ripe for appeal. 195 In 2004, however,
West Virginia ran its scheduled judicial elections, and Don Blankenship,
chairman, CEO, and president of Massey, supported lawyer Brent Benjamin
in his quest to unseat and replace Justice McGraw on the West Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals. 19 6 Blankenship donated close to $2.5 million to
an organization that supported Benjamin and opposed McGraw; the money
donated by Blankenship made up more than two-thirds of the money that
organization raised.'97 Furthermore, Blankenship spent another $500,000 in
independent expenditures supporting Benjamin (direct mailings, letters to
prospective donors, media advertisements, and more).'98  The $3 million
spent by Blankenship was more than the total amount of money spent by the
rest of Benjamin's supporters combined, and about three times what
Benjamin's own committee spent.'99 Benjamin won with 53.3% of the votes
and took his place on the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals.200
In October 2005, Caperton preemptively asked then-Justice Benjamin to
recuse himself from any potential appeals that involved Massey; Justice
Benjamin denied the motion.20' In December 2006, Massey filed an appeal
challenging the $50 million jury verdict, and the Supreme Court of Appeals
of West Virginia granted review.202 In November 2007, the court reversed
the jury verdict in a 3-2 decision with Benjamin casting the deciding vote.203
Caperton asked for a rehearing, and both parties sought to recuse three of the
five sitting justices: Massey asked for one recusal; Caperton for two, one of
which was Benjamin. 204 Benjamin was the only one who refused to recuse
himself-for the second time-and, acting as Chief Justice, selected two
judges to replace the two justices who did recuse.205 Before the rehearing,
Caperton moved again-for the third time-to disqualify Justice Benjamin,
but its request was denied, and Benjamin went on to cast the deciding vote,
again, in a 3-2 opinion in favor of Massey. 206 The United States Supreme
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Court then granted certiorari.207
The issue before the Court was whether the Fourteenth Amendment's
Due Process Clause was violated when Justice Benjamin refused to recuse
himself.208 The majority began by reiterating that the basic requirement of
due process is a fair trial before a fair court2 09 and that '"[n]o man is allowed
to be a judge in his own cause; because his interest would certainly bias his
judgment, and, not improbably, corrupt his integrity."'21 0 Nonetheless, the
Court concluded that (1) this principle did not mean that bias or prejudice
was enough grounds for disqualification, 211 and (2) most issues pertaining to
judicial recusal and disqualification-personal bias, kinship, degree of
interest-will not present a constitutional question, and will be left to the
legislature to circumscribe.212
However, in certain circumstances where "the probability of actual bias
on the part of the judge . .. is too high to be constitutionally tolerable," the
Court had mandated disqualification.213 Those circumstances included: (1)
an interest in the outcome of the case (i.e., Tumey and Ward)2 4-although a
lesser one than the common law would have sanctioned;21 1 (2) the
involvement of the judge in a pending but similar action (i.e., Lavoie);2 16 and
(3) criminal contempt actions (i.e., Murchison),217 run by the same judge
who previously presided over the proceeding resulting in the contempt. 218
Justice Kennedy summarized the Court's line of cases with two principles:
(1) judges are not allowed to try cases if they have an interest in their
outcome; the interest that would disqualify the judge is not precisely
defined-relationships and circumstances are to be considered;219 and (2)
the inquiry is an objective one; not whether the judge is actually biased, but
whether it is likely that the average judge in the given circumstances would
207. Id. at 2259.
208. Id. at 2256.
209. Id. at 2259 (quoting In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955)); see also supra notes 166-
73 and accompanying text for further discussion on In re Murchison.
210. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2259 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 36, at 59 (James
Madison)); see also Frank, supra note 27, at 611-12.
211. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2259 (quoting Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 820
(1986)); see also supra notes 174-78 and accompanying text for further discussion on Lavoie.
212. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2259 (quoting Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523 (1927)); see also
supra notes 148-57 and accompanying text for further discussion on Tumey.
213. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2259 (quoting Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35,47 (1975)).
214. See id at 2259-60.
215. Id at 2260.
216. Id. at 2260-61.
217. Id at 2261.
218. Id
219. Id (citations omitted).
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be neutral, or whether an unconstitutional potential for bias exists. 22 0 It is
the risk of actual bias that we must also guard against, if the due process
guarantee is to have any meaning.22 1
While recognizing that not all campaign contributions rise to the level of
a due process violation, Justice Kennedy defined the case before the Court to
be exceptional, based on the relative size of Blankenship's contribution
compared to the total sum contributed by all of Benjamin's supporters and
the total sum spent in the election process by both parties.222 The test was
solely whether the "possible temptation to the average .. . judge ... [might]
lead him not to hold the balance nice, clear and true."223 The Court
concluded that the extreme facts of the case raised the probability of actual
bias to unconstitutional levels. 2 24 The majority opinion closed by restating
that the Due Process Clause defined the outer boundary of judicial recusal,
and that legislatures may impose more stringent rules.225
Chief Justice Roberts dissented, joined by Justices Thomas, Alito, and
Scalia, and warned about the difficulty the courts will have in implementing
this outer boundary. The dissent submitted forty questions to the Court
and criticized the majority for creating new constitutional rights, 227 as well
as failing to "formulate a 'judicially discernible and manageable
standard' . .. 228 At the most basic level, the dissent asked, will this case
apply only to judicial campaign contributions or to judicial disqualifications
in general?229  The dissent also expressed concern that Caperton will
diminish the confidence of the people in the justice system.230 Justice Scalia
expressed the same opinion in his own dissent. 23' He also foresaw a flood of
litigation based on Caperton-type claims and warned against trying to right
all wrongs through the Constitution.232
7. Caperton Aftermath
In 1990, in Texas, Charles Dean Hood was found guilty of double
homicide by a jury of his peers.233 During trial there were rumors that the
220. Id. at 2262.
221. Id. at 2263.
222. Id. at 2263-64.
223. Id at 2264 (citations omitted).
224. Id. at 2265.
225. Id. at 2267.
226. Id. (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
227. Id. at 2267-73.
228. Id at 2272 (quoting Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 257, 306 (2004)).
229. See id at 2269.
230. Id at 2274.
231. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
232. Id. at 2274-75. Justice Scalia reminded his colleagues that some issues are non-justiciable.
233. See Hood v. State, 158 S.W.3d 480 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (citing Hood v. State, No.
1134
[Vol. 38: 1109, 2011] Due Process and Judicial Disqualification
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
trial judge and the prosecutor were romantically involved.234 In 2008, both
the judge and the prosecutor were deposed and confirmed their relationship
and their efforts to keep it confidential, but the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals still rejected Hood's habeas petition.235 Hood then petitioned the
U.S. Supreme Court, claiming that the secret relationship between the judge
and the prosecutor violated his due process right to a fair trial. 236  Legal
experts expected the Supreme Court to take the case to apply and support the
rule announced in Caperton.23 7 The Supreme Court denied certiorari,2 38 to
the disappointment of many that followed the case.
The judge in Hood did not recuse herself from presiding over a criminal
trial prosecuted by her paramour. Under Texas law, the judge did not have
to recuse herself sua sponte.239 What about the highest Court in the land?
Do Justices of the United States Supreme Court abide by any recusal rules?
E. Recusal for Supreme Court Justices in the Modern Era
In 1946, Justice Jackson created media frenzy when he criticized fellow
Justice Black for not recusing himself in a case advocated by a lawyer who
240had been Black's partner twenty years prior. Scholars analyzing the issue
at the time concluded (after examining practices by such famous Justices as
Holmes, Brandeis, and Cardozo) that Jackson's criticism was unwarranted,
and that Black's decision was in line with 150 years of tradition.24 1
Nevertheless, in 1952, Justice Frankfurter recused himself in Public Utilities
Commission of District of Columbia v. Pollak because he strongly objected
to the playing of radio programs on public buses.242 He took the
unprecedented action of explaining and memorializing his decision: "My
feelings are so strongly engaged as a victim of the practice in controversy
that I had better not participate in judicial judgment upon it." 243 Justice
71,167, slip op. at 1 (Tex. Crim. App. Nov. 24,1993)).




237. Id. at 25.
238. 130 S. Ct. 2097 (2010).
239. See infra note 599 and surrounding text.
240. Frank, supra note 27, at 605. The case was Jewell Ridge Coal Corp. v. Local No. 6167,
United Mine Workers ofAm., 325 U.S. 161 (1945).
241. Frank, supra note 27, at 634-35.
242. Pub. Utils. Comm'n of D.C. v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 466-67 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., stating
reasons he took no part in the consideration or decision of the case).
243. Id. at 467.
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Frankfurter carefully considered his judicial training, habits, and discipline,
but ended up deciding that his subconscious hatred for the playing of radio
on the bus would influence his ultimate judgment or be thusly perceived by
others. 2" His cautious stance and his meticulous written justification has
seldom been followed.
The late 1960s and early 1970s were laden with events involving
Supreme Court justices. In 1968, President Johnson nominated his long-
time friend and confidante, Associate Justice Abe Fortas, to the post of Chief
Justice, replacing Earl Warren.245 Even while serving as a Justice, Abe
Fortas had a habit of counseling the President on important matters (such as
the escalation of the Vietnam War and the appropriate response to the
Detroit riots).246 This prompted the first ever Senate filibuster in history
over a Supreme Court nomination.247 Justice Fortas's troubles were not over
and he resigned in 1969-the first Justice ever to do so-after revelations of
involvement with financier Louis Wolfson.24 8 Later that year, the Senate
rejected Judge Clement Haynsworth's nomination to replace Fortas on the
Supreme Court because he participated in five cases in which he had small
pecuniary interests.249 In 1972, freshly minted Associate Justice Rehnquist
declined to recuse himself in Laird v. Tatum.250 Earlier, as a Department of
Justice lawyer, Rehnquist had testified as an expert witness on the matter at
Senate hearings. 2 51 The case was decided 5-4 in the Supreme Court, and a
motion for recusal and rehearing was filed.252 Justice Rehnquist denied the
recusal motion and his memorandum explaining his decision was a first in
the practice of the Supreme Court.253 Rehnquist found he had a duty to sit,
particularly because there was no replacement for a recused Justice, which
could lead to an equally divided Court.254 His concerns would later be
mirrored in a written Statement of Recusal Policy signed by seven Supreme
Court Justices: 255
244. Id at 466-67.
245. Filibuster Derails Supreme Court Appointment, U.S. SENATE (Oct. 1, 1968), http://www.
senate.gov/artandhistory/history/minute/FilibusterDerails_SupremeCourt Appointment.htm (last
visited Mar. 18, 2010).
246. See MACKENZIE, supra note 85, at 24.
247. U.S. SENATE, supra note 245.
248. See MACKENZIE, supra note 85, at 71-76.
249. Amanda Frost, Keeping Up Appearances: A Process-Oriented Approach to Judicial Recusal,
53 U. KAN. L. REv. 531, 545 (2005); see also MACKENZIE, supra note 85, at 67-94.
250. Laird v. Tatum, 409 U.S. 824 (1972). This case challenged the constitutionality of the
surveillance of civilian political activity by the Army. Id.
251. See Frost, supra note 249, at 545.
252. Id.
253. See Laird, 409 U.S. at 824.
254. Id. at 837.
255. Justices Rehnquist, Stevens, O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Ginsburg signed the
statement. Justices Blackmun and Souter did not sign it. Chief Justice Roberts adopted this policy
in November 2005.
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We have spouses, children or other relatives within the degree of
relationship covered by 28 U.S.C. § 455 who are or may become
practicing attorneys....
... We think that a relative's partnership in the firm appearing
before us, or his or her previous work as a lawyer on a case that
later comes before us, does not automatically trigger [recusal]....
We do not think it would serve the public interest to go beyond
the requirements of the statute, and to recuse ourselves, out of an
excess of caution, whenever a relative is a partner in the firm before
us or acted as a lawyer at an earlier stage. Even one unnecessary
recusal impairs the functioning of the Court. . . . In this Court,
where the absence of one Justice cannot be made up [by the
presence] of another, needless recusal ... produces the possibility
of an even division on the merits of the case, and has a distorting
effect upon the [appeals] process requiring the petitioner to
obtain. . . four votes out of eight instead of four out of nine.
Absent some special factor, therefore, we will not recuse
ourselves by reason of a relative's participation as a lawyer in the
earlier stages of the case. One such special factor . .. would be the
relative's functioning as the lead counsel below. .. . We shall
recuse ourselves whenever, to our knowledge, a relative has been
lead counsel below.
Another special factor, of course, would be the fact that the
amount of the relative's compensation could be substantially
affected by the outcome here. That would require our recusal even
if the relative had not worked on the case, but was merely a partner
in the firm that shared the profits....
In 2004, after vacationing with then-Vice President Cheney, 25 Justice
Scalia cited the abovementioned policy in his twenty-one page memorandum
in support of his decision not to recuse himself in Cheney v. United States
District Court for the District of Columbia.258  The media outcry was
national in scope.259 Soon thereafter, it was Justice Ginsburg's turn to be
256. FLAMM, supra note 6, at 1101-03.
257. Justice Scalia had traveled on Air Force Two as "an official guest" of the Vice President's for
a duck-hunting trip. David G. Savage & Richard A. Serrano, Scalia Was Cheney Hunt Trip Guest,
L.A. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2004, at Al.
258. 541 U.S. 913 (2004).
259. See, e.g., Editorial, Scalia, Use Good Judgment; Bow Out of Cheney Case, ATL. J.-CONST.,
Jan. 29, 2004, at 14A; Editorial, Scalia's Apparent Conflict, BOS. GLOBE, Feb. 7, 2004, at A14;
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criticized for allowing her name to be used in the "Justice Ruth Bader
Ginsburg Distinguished Lecture Series," co-sponsored by the National
Organization for Women (NOW).26o So far, she has declined to do so.
Scholars will continue to keep a close watch over the recusal practices of
Justices of the United States Supreme Court.
IV. THE NEED FOR RECUSAL REFORM-PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
A. Judicial Elections: Zero-Sum Game?
It has been argued that judicial elections create a zero-sum game
because judicial candidates have a First Amendment right to express their
positions to the electorate and to receive campaign contributions, while at
the same time they will potentially lose their appearance of impartiality and
infringe on a litigant's due process guarantee to a fair trial.2 6' Historically,
judicial elections were relatively quiet,262 based on the candidates'
perception that such elections and their campaigns were fundamentally
different from other types of elections. 263  However, they have been
transformed by personal attacks unrelated to the candidates' qualifications,
and increased campaign spending.264 The growing importance of money
and the perceived inefficiency of judicial ethics codes have led to a loss of
public confidence in the courts as impartial arbiters.265
States had, in the past, responded to due process concerns through
campaign speech restrictions, until the Supreme Court invalidated such
restrictions in White.266 While nothing in the High Court's jurisprudence
addresses the matter of restricting solicitations for campaign contributions,
Editorial, Scalia's Not-So-Excellent Journey; Hunting Trip with Cheney Was Highly Inappropriate,
BUFFALO NEWS, Feb. 4, 2004, at C4; Editorial, Sit This One Out, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Feb. 8, 2004, at
35; Editorial, Too Close for Comfort, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Jan. 23, 2004, at 10A; Editorial,
Scalia's Conflict ofInterest, DENVER POST, Jan. 26, 2004, at B7; Editorial, One Case Scalia Should
Skip, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 22, 2004, at B16; Editorial, Duck-Blinded Ethics; Scalia Puts Supreme Court
Integrity at Risk, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Feb. 6, 2004, at B8; Editorial, Too Close for Comfort,
S.F. CHRON., Jan. 26, 2004, at B6; Editorial, Scalia Should Recuse Himself SEATTLE POST-
INTELLIGENCER, Feb. 9,2004, at B5.
260. Frost, supra note 249, at 533 n.7. More than a dozen Republican members of Congress
demanded that Justice Ginsburg recuse herself from all future abortion-related cases. Id.
261. David K. Stott, Zero-Sum Judicial Elections: Balancing Free Speech and Impartiality
Through Recusal Reform, 2009 BYU L. REV. 481, 481 (2009).
262. "[A]s exciting as a game of checkers [p]layed by mail." Bert Brandenburg & Roy A.
Schotland, Justice in Peril: The Endangered Balance Between Impartial Courts and Judicial
Election Campaigns, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1229, 1231 (2008) (citations omitted).
263. Thomas R. Phillips & Karlene Dunn Poll, Free Speech For Judges and Fair Appeals For
Litigants: Judicial Recusal in a Post-White World, 55 DRAKE L. REv. 691, 693 (2007).
264. Id. at 693-94.
265. Deborah Goldberg, James Sample & David E. Pozen, The Best Defense: Why Elected Courts
ShouldLead Recusal Reform, 46 WASHBURN L.J. 503, 503-04 (2007).
266. Stott, supra note 261, at 482.
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states and lower courts have interpreted White to mean that such restrictions
would be unconstitutional as well.26 7 The White decision 268 brought about
increased spending by political parties and special interests, sterilized
judicial codes of conduct, and placed strong pressure on candidates to issue
pre-election statements committing them to positions desired by their
electoral base.269
As the money spent in judicial campaigns increased significantly, the
Supreme Court first declined to consider its due process impact in Avery v.
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.,270 only later deciding, in
Caperton, to intervene.271 Some scholars have opined that Caperton was
wrongly decided and have accused Justice Kennedy-who provided the
swing vote and wrote the opinion-of retreating from his previous position
in White as an ardent supporter of political speech and campaign
financing.272 The recent Citizens United case, deciding that restrictions on
corporate campaign spending violate the First Amendment (and written by
the same Justice Kennedy),273 shows that such an analysis is incomplete at
best. As the line of cases shows and as the Court has explicitly said, the
solution is not to be found in restrictions on campaign speech and financing,
but in better disqualification standards.274 The Court has consistently struck
down laws and rules that infringed the First Amendment rights of judicial
candidates and, just as consistently, has protected litigants' due process
267. See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 416 F.3d 738, 763 (8th Cir. 2005) (striking down
Minnesota's solicitation clause); see also Weaver v. Bonner, 309 F.3d 1312, 1321 (11th Cir. 2002)
(striking down Georgia's solicitation canon).
268. The White decision was viewed by some to validate an underlying theory that judicial
impartiality is not constitutionally mandated, but was merely a policy choice to be subordinated to
the First Amendment. See Donald L. Burnett, Jr., A Cancer on the Republic: The Assault upon
Impartiality of State Courts and the Challenge to Judicial Selection, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 265,
276 (2007). Such point of view was seen particularly in Justice O'Connor's observation that "[i]f
the State has a problem with judicial impartiality, it is largely one that the State brought upon itself
by continuing the practice of popularly electing judges." Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536
U.S. 765, 792 (2002) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
269. Stott, supra note 261, at 498.
270. Avery v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 547 U.S. 1003 (2006). In this case, State Farm had
an outstanding jury verdict against it to the tune of $1 billion, and its appeal was to be heard and
decided only after one seat on the Illinois Supreme Court would be filled; the two sides to the
electoral battle spent a combined $9.3 million dollars in the election. Goldberg, supra note 265, at
510. The candidate supported by State Farm won and then cast the vote that decided the case,
reversing the jury award. Id.
271. See supra notes 193-232 and accompanying text for further discussion on Caperton.
272. Terri R. Day, Buying Justice: Caperton v. A.T. Massey: Campaign Dollars, Mandatory
Recusal and Due Process, 28 Miss. C. L. REV. 359, 374-76 (2009).
273. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 882 (2010).
274. See supra notes 178 and 193-232 and accompanying text.
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rights by expanding the grounds for judicial disqualification. 27 5  If a
litigant's right to an impartial adjudicator can be protected without
infringing on judicial candidates' rights to speak their mind and receive
campaign contributions, then judicial elections are no longer a zero-sum
game, but rather a win-win situation.
B. Why Do We Need Recusal Reform?
As John Adams wrote in the original Massachusetts Constitution of
1780, we have a right to a trial by "judges as free, impartial, and independent
as the lot of humanity will admit." 27 6  Judiciary independence is also an
important part of the separation of powers in our constitutional
democracy.277 This judicial impartiality is now under attack by the political
branches and economic special interests. 2 78 James Madison warned that the
separation of powers must be maintained lest "[t]he accumulation of all
powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of
one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may
justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny."279 Justice Kennedy,
the author of the majority opinion in both White and Caperton, once said
"The law makes a promise.. . . The promise is neutrality. If that promise is
broken, the law ceases to exist. All that's left is the dictate of a tyrant, or a
mob."280
Recusal is a safeguard needed to restore and keep that promise. But
most recusal decisions (whether approved or not) are made without
providing a detailed written opinion. 28 1 The motions to disqualify are costly
and risky, bearing a small chance of success because of the heavy
evidentiary burdens.282 Parties and lawyers who foresee a continuing
relationship with that court will also be discouraged 28 3 and will fear angering
the judge. 284 Having the challenged judges decide the motions discourages
275. See supra notes 193-232 and accompanying text.
276. See Schotland, supra note 38, at 1079.
277. Id.
278. Burnett, supra note 268, at 265. Our constitutional republic used structural separation of
powers to combat two forms of tyranny: "[T]he oppression of the many by the few, and the
oppression of the few by the many." Id. at 266.
279. THE FEDERALIST No.47, supra note 36, at 301 (James Madison).
280. Joan Biskupic, Two Justices DefendJudicial Independence, SEATTLE TIMES, Dec. 6, 1998, at
A22, available at 1998 WLNR 1532334.
281. Goldberg, supra note 265, at 524.
282. Id.
283. Id
284. See R. Matthew Pearson, Note, Duck Duck Recuse? Foreign Common Law Guidance &
Improving Recusal of Supreme Court Justices, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1799, 1833-34 (2005)
("[A]sking a challenged [judge] to rule on a motion to recuse puts that [judgel in a precarious
position. , . . [B]ecause a [judge] is expected to recuse himself sua sponte if there is a reasonable
apprehension of bias, a successful motion to recuse requires the [judge] to admit that he failed in the
1140
[Vol. 38: 1109, 2011] Due Process and Judicial Disqualification
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
their filing, and decreases the chances of success once the motions are
filed.285 Having the motion decided by a colleague judge is only a minute
improvement.286 Moreover it is quite easy for judges to deny recusal
motions when they are not required to hear the parties in the matter or justify
their decisions.2 87 Furthermore, for most people bias is unconscious, 288 and
research in social psychology shows that most biased people will
underestimate and undercorrect for their prejudices. 289 The furious debate in
public forums regarding Justice Scalia's refusal to recuse in Cheney290
demonstrates that current disqualification law is not efficient at protecting
the judiciary's reputation for independence.291
Judicial independence is "an essential safeguard against the effects of
occasional ill humors in the society."292 Our Founding Fathers, in the
Declaration of Independence, listed the lack of judicial independence as one
of the important grievances of the American people: "[The king] has made
Judges dependent on his Will alone for the tenure of their offices, and the
amount and payment of their salaries."293 Replacing "the king" with "the
people" does not yield better results. It is worth noting that unelected judges
have regularly reversed decisions made by elected bodies and still have
commanded the respect of the public. 294 Process and procedural safeguards,
rather than accountability to the public, have legitimized the appointed
judiciary.295
The recognized process in American law has the following components:
(1) litigants initiate the disputes; 296 (2) the disputes are put forward through
first instance to adhere to statutory and ethical requirements.").
285. In Berger v. United States, 255 U.S. 22 (1921), defendants (some of German descent) were
under the accusation of espionage. The judge for this case had previously stated: "One must have a
very judicial mind, indeed, not to be prejudiced against the German-Americans in this country.
Their hearts are reeking with disloyalty." Despite this, he refused to recuse himself and sentenced
the defendants to twenty years in prison. Id. at 28.
286. Goldberg, supra note 264, at 524-25.
287. Id.
288. Tobin A. Sparling, Keeping up Appearances: The Constitutionality of the Model Code of
Judicial Conduct's Prohibition ofExtrajudicial Speech Creating the Appearance ofBias, 19 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHics 441, 480 (2006) ("[Some] judges may convince themselves they can rule fairly,
unaware that the currents of bias often run deep.").
289. Goldberg, supra note 265, at 525.
290. 541 U.S. 913 (2004); see also supra note 258.
291. Frost, supra note 249, at 532.
292. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, supra note 36, at 470 (Alexander Hamilton).
293. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 11 (U.S. 1776).
294. Frost, supra note 249, at 554.
295. Id
296. Courts must wait for "cases" or "controversies" to be raised before them. U.S. CONST. art.
III, § 2.
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an adversarial system; 297 (3) judgments must be supported by a rationale;2 98
(4) judgments must be grounded in the law;2 99 and (5) the judge must be
impartial. 300 The current law of recusal, around the nation, offends one or
more of these principles. For example, disqualification is made difficult
under federal law by an absence of statutory provisions for procedure.30o
Opposition of a recusal motion by the other party is also difficult because
that party lacks knowledge of the facts.3 02 It is rather the judge who plays
the role of the adversary party, but in an unfair way: getting to decide the
matter, and rarely giving a reasoned (and written) explanation.0 Justice
Frankfurter's example of writing a separate opinion explaining the reasons
for his decision in a recusal motion'0 has rarely been followed.305 As far as
grounding these decisions in the law, it is a thorny issue. Most written
opinions regarding recusal are made by judges who deny such motions,
providing little or no case law for future movants.o' Justice Scalia recused
himself without explanation in Elk Grove Unified School District v.
Newdow,307 but wrote a twenty-one page justification to his decision not to
297. The parties' participation in the process legitimizes the judgment. Frost, supra note 249, at
559-60. The judiciary is not equipped, nor empowered to undertake factual investigations. Id. at
560.
298. Congress, which is legitimized through periodic elections, legislates without justification, but
courts legitimize themselves by providing reasons for their decisions. Frost, supra note 249, at 561.
Justice Kennedy quipped, "We are the only branch of the government that must give reasons for
what we do. They are in the opinions." Tony Mauro, Courtside: When Planets Collide, LEGAL
TIMES, Mar. 29, 2004, at 10, available at 2004 WLNR 23406968. A congressman responded, "We
give reasons, too. It is called re-election." Id.
299. "[Clourts may act only when there is law, based on precedent, to apply. Courts do not
possess authority to assert their own will." Todd D. Peterson, Restoring Structural Checks on
Judicial Power in the Era of Managerial Judging, U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 41, 55 (1995). "To avoid an
arbitrary discretion in the courts, it is indispensable that they should be bound down by strict rules
and precedents, which serve to define and point out their duty in every particular case that comes
before them. . . ." THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 36, at 496 (Alexander Hamilton).
300. Frost, supra note 249 at 555-56. There may not be agreement as to why these procedural
factors strengthen legitimacy, but there is general agreement that they do. Id. The Constitution
grants life tenure and undiminished salaries for this very purpose, because "a power over a man's
subsistence amounts to a power over his will." See U.S. CONST., art. III, para. 1; see also THE
FEDERALIST NO. 79, supra note 36, at 504 (Alexander Hamilton). Federal diversity jurisdiction is
also anchored in impartiality. See U.S. CONST., art. III, para. 2. Finally, the Supreme Court
emphasized that having an impartial judge is an essential element of due process, under the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments. See Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 60-62 (1972).
301. Frost, supra note 249, at 567.
302. Id.
303. Id.
304. See supra notes 243-44 and accompanying text.
305. Frost, supra note 249, at 569.
306. Leubsdorf, supra note 101, at 244-45 ("[A) judge who withdraws usually writes no opinion.
Published opinions, consequently, form an accumulating mound of reasons and precedents against
withdrawal; meanwhile, some judges routinely and silently disqualify themselves in comparable
cases.").
307. 540 U.S. 945 (2003) (a challenge to the recitation of the pledge of allegiance in public
schools).
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recuse in Cheney.308 The fifth and most important tenet, judge impartiality,
is not consistent with the self-judging of recusal motions, which is the law in
most states and the federal system,30 and finding an impartial appellate
judge for an interlocutory appeal places a heavy burden on litigants. 310  In
fact, it is so ingrained in our judiciary that the challenged judge should pass
upon a recusal motion that Chief Justice Rehnquist rebuked Senators Patrick
Leahy and Joe Lieberman for questioning Justice Scalia in Cheney while the
case was pending. 1  But Scalia's memorandum has more similarities with
an opposing party's document than with a neutral adjudicator's decision; the
author is, after all, justifying his own conduct.3 12 Judicial recusal is in need
of reform, at all levels.
C. Proposed Recusal Reforms
1. Make the Motions More Affordable
The costs of a disqualification motion can significantly add to litigants'
financial burdens." There is a need to lessen these extra burdens to provide
a streamlined and affordable recusal process. Disclosure requirements 314
and peremptory challenges 315 will also help.
2. Define Strict Rules for Mandatory Recusal
Mandatory disqualification when impartiality may reasonably be
questioned strengthens judicial independence and protects parties from the
judges who owe a debt of gratitude to outside forces. 1 Freedom from prior
restraint (White) does not translate into freedom from recusal." The ABA
has recommended instituting a rule for mandatory recusal for judges who
308. See supra notes 257-58 and accompanying text.
309. See supra notes 103-12 and 113-47 respectively; see also Appendix infra notes 382-641.
310. Frost, supra note 249, at 571-72.
311. "[I]t has long been settled that each justice must decide such a question for himself. ...
Anyone at all is free to criticize the action of a justice-as to recusal or as to the merits-after the
case has been decided. But ... any suggestion ... as to why a justice should recuse himself in a
pending case is ill-considered." See David G. Savage, High Court Won't Reconsider Scalia's
Recusal Decision, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2004, at A12.
312. Frost, supra note 249, at 591.
313. Stott, supra note 261, at 509.
314. See infra notes 336-40 and accompanying text.
315. See infra notes 326-35 and accompanying text.
316. Burnett, Jr., supra note 268, at 288.
317. Id at 289. Recusal would lose its safety net function. Id.
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have accepted significant campaign contributions from a party."' The
Caperton aftermath is still unknown but will, most likely, deem such a rule
constitutional, as a guarantee of due process. A rule pertaining to campaign
contributions will most likely establish a ceiling that would trigger automatic
disqualification.3 '9  An added benefit is providing a disincentive to special
interests to spend large sums in a race that should really be run locally.320
No state has yet adopted the ABA proposed rule321 for two reasons. First, in
the states that have legal limits to campaign contributions, those limits work
to limit the possibility of actual or perceived bias.322 We should be mindful
that the Supreme Court has not (yet) considered a case that challenges such
limits on First Amendment grounds.3 23 Second, such a rule could have an
adverse effect: parties could make over-the-limit contributions for the sole
purpose of disqualifying a judge they do not like.324 Allowing waivers for
disqualification would prevent such gamesmanship and preserve the efficacy
of the rule.325
3. Peremptory Disqualification
Peremptorily challenging a judge is similar to peremptorily striking
jurors.32 Seventeen states that elect their judges already allow it, and so
does Hawai'i-a state that uses a merit system.327 Allowing peremptory
challenges will most likely result in an increased number of
disqualifications.328 By getting one "free pass," parties will skip an
expensive and risky recusal motion. 329 They would still be able to challenge
the next-appointed judge for cause. The risk is that a peremptory challenge
will be used to strike a judge who the litigant perceives as unfavorable rather
than partial, leading to judge-shopping, and undermining the reputation of
the judiciary.330 Yet such risks are currently being faced, and met, in the
jury selection process-a process that has been found to promote confidence
318. Goldberg, supra note 265, at 528.
319. Id. at 529.
320. Id.
321. Id.
322. Id. Such states would benefit more from mandatory recusal rules that would target aggregate
contributions from donors associated with one litigant. Id. In the Illinois Supreme Court race in
Avery, State Farm made no direct contributions, but individuals and entities closely associated with it
contributed an aggregate of more than $1 million. See supra note 270.
323. Such a decision would be the "campaign-contributions" equivalent of White.
324. Goldberg, supra note 265, at 529.
325. Id.
326. Id. at 526.
327. See Schotland, supra note 38, at 1102.
328. Goldberg, supra note 265, at 526.
329. Id
330. Frost, supra note 249, at 587.
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in juries. 3
A bigger problem is the burden placed on the administration of the
courts: there are a lot more jurors in jury pools than there are judges waiting
in the wings to take over for a disqualified colleague. A proposed solution
that would alleviate the risk of abusing the peremptory system is the
requirement that an affidavit be filed 332 explaining the reason for challenging
the judge. Offensive reasons could be identified,3 and improper recusal
motions could be denied.334 Administrative burdens can also be reduced by
limiting the number of peremptory challenges allowed to one litigant in the
same action (most states allow only one per litigant, per action) and by
requiring that the challenges be made before the judge has spent significant
time and energy on the case. Peremptory disqualification is a solid
preventative measure against both bias and appearance of bias.
4. Disclosure
Improved disclosure by judges of campaign activities is another measure
available to improve the disqualification process.336  It would be difficult
and costly for litigants to discover relevant information, so judges could be
required to have on file copies of their campaign statements, as well as
information on their campaign finances. 3 Disclosure need not be limited to
the presentment of such documents for parties' inspection. Judges could be
required to disclose, before the trial starts, any additional circumstances that
could affect their impartiality or create an appearance of prejudice.138 The
main disadvantages of enhanced disclosure are the administrative burden on
the court system 339 and the fact that disclosure, while providing bases for
recusal, does not guarantee it. 340 But, the benefits outweigh the burdens.
331. Goldberg, supra note 265, at 527.
332. See FLAMM, supra note 6, § 26.5, at 767-69 (describing the requirement of an affidavit in
some states that have peremptory challenges).
333. Goldberg, supra note 265, at 527.
334. It is important to note that only in special circumstances would a peremptory challenge be









5. Independent Adjudication of Recusal Motions
Recusal motions are different than other procedural motions because
they implicate the very legitimacy of the legal system. 34 ' And yet, in many
jurisdictions, it is the challenged judges themselves who pass upon the
motion, most often with no prospect of review (interlocutory or
otherwise). 34 2  Recusal motions can be taken personally, 343 and therefore
litigants will still dread judicial retribution.3" Both neutrality and
objectivity are in jeopardy,345 and while good arguments have been made for
judges self-deciding the motions,346 the same arguments function just as well
in the context of independently adjudicated motions, 347 and a handful of
states have already done so.348 The administrative costs of implementing
independent adjudication of recusal motions must be borne to carry into
effect the litigant's most important due process right to a fair tribunal and the
critical social interest in protecting the judiciary's reputation for impartiality.
Administrative measures can be implemented to prevent frivolous recusal
motions.
6. Written Opinions for the Motions
Records are sparse regarding decisions and their reasoning, 34 9 and this
negatively affects the development of any jurisprudence in the recusal area,
much less a consistent one. Basic democratic values in general, and judicial
ones in particular, should require judges to explain their decisions. 3s0  A
written opinion would also enable appellate courts to make informed
decisions on review. Recusal motions should be memorialized.
7. Interlocutory Appeal and De Novo Review
In theory, a litigant has four potential courses of action after being
341. Id. at 530.
342. See Leslie W. Abramson, Deciding Recusal Motions: Who Judges the Judges?, 28 VAL. U.
L. REV. 543, 547 (twenty-seven states place the recusal decision "within the sound discretion of the
challenged judge").
343. See Sparling, supra note 288 and accompanying text.
344. See Stott, supra note 261, at 507.
345. See Goldberg, supra note 265, at 530.
346. Judges are the persons closest to the alleged facts; the risk of recusal "fishing expeditions" is
reduced; and efficiency is enhanced without a protracted fact-finding process. Id.
347. Id Judges' best knowledge of the facts is counterweighed by the potential bias suggested by
the same facts; "fishing expeditions" are just as powerfully deterred by an independent adjudicator
who can impose sanctions; and efficiency can be preserved by the use of affidavits. Id. at 530-31.
348. See supra notes 103-12 and accompanying text; see also Appendix infra notes 382-641.
349. Goldberg, supra note 265, at 531.
350. Id; see also Leubsdorf, supra note 101, at 244-45 ("Published opinions ... form an
accumulating mound of reasons and precedents.").
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denied a recusal motion: a petition for rehearing, an appeal after a final
decision in the case, an interlocutory appeal, and writ relief.' The
challenged judge is usually reluctant to reconsider, and appeals from final
decisions have consistently been turned down because "[o]nce the
proceedings in the [lower] court are complete, the harm sought to be avoided
by the requirement of recusal for appearance of impropriety has been
done."352 Because of this irreparable damage, to the litigants and to the
people's confidence in the judiciary, all federal circuits employ writs of
mandamus as a way to challenge a defeated motion to recuse under Section
455.*" Interlocutory appeals give litigants extra protection against bias or
perceived bias-especially in jurisdictions where judges self-decide recusal
motions. In criminal cases, the ability to file an interlocutory appeal after
losing a motion to disqualify is crucial for the government because a trial
verdict for the defendant, on the merits, will terminate the case and render
illusory a final judgment appeal. On appeal, the abuse of discretion standard
is used in most federal3 54 and state courts.355 But this standard relies on the
assumed legitimacy of the lower court proceedings-legitimacy brought in
doubt by the very recusal motion. 35 6 If the lower court has self-judged, the
impartiality interest would dictate de novo review; if the lower court
decision was made by an alternate judge, no deference by the appeals court
would be warranted.3 s? Efficiency losses, for both interlocutory appeals and
de novo review, result from an increased load for the appellate courts, but
they are justified when compared with the gains in fair trial guarantees.
351. See FLAMM, supra note 6, § 32.1, at 960.
352. United States v. Troxell, 887 F.2d 830, 833 (7th Cir. 1989) (citation omitted); see also
Nateman v. Greenbaum, 582 So. 2d 643 (Fla. App. 1991) (Baskin, J., dissenting) (stating that
appellate review after a final decision, as a remedy for a denied recusal motion, thwarted its very
purpose).
353. See, e.g., In re United States, 666 F.2d 690, 694 (1st Cir. 1981); In re IBM Corp., 618 F.2d
923, 926-27 (2d Cir. 1980); In re Sch. Asbestos Litig., 977 F.2d 764, 774-78 (3d Cir. 1992); In re
Rogers, 537 F.2d 1196, 1197 n. 1 (4th Cir. 1976) (per curiam); In re Corrugated Container Antitrust
Litig., 614 F.2d 958, 961 n.4 (5th Cir. 1980); In re Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 919 F.2d 1136, 1139-43
(6th Cir. 1990); SCA Servs. v. Morgan, 557 F.2d 110, 117 (7th Cir. 1977) (per curiam); Liddell v.
Bd. of Educ., 677 F.2d 626, 643 (8th Cir. 1982); In re Cement Antitrust Litig., 673 F.2d 1020, 1025
(9th Cir. 1982); Bell v. Chandler, 569 F.2d 556, 559 (10th Cir. 1978).
354. A notable federal court exception is the Seventh Circuit. See United States v. Balistrieri, 779
F.2d 1191, 1203 (7th Cir. 1985); see also Sac & Fox Nation of Okla. v. Cuomo, 193 F.3d 1162,
1168 (10th Cir. 1999) (applying de novo standard where district judge "did not create a record or
document her decision not to recuse").
355. In some circumstances de novo review is also used in Colorado, Florida, Minnesota, and
Wisconsin. FLAMM, supra note 6, § 33.1, at 987.
356. Leubsdorf, supra note 101, at 276.
357. See Goldberg, supra note 265, at 531-32.
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8. Provide Substitutes for Disqualified Judges
In the Avery case, if the challenged Justice had recused himself, the
court would have been evenly split, giving a default victory to the party that
had won in the lower court. 1 8 This creates the potential for gamesmanship
and reduces the value of jurisprudence established in this manner,5 unless
the courts adopt procedures to substitute for the disqualified judges.36 o
9. Educate the Judiciary
Providing seminars presenting the social and psychological evidence
about bias and stressing the importance to the judicial system of avoiding
bias or its appearance would help judges identify and correct unconscious
bias. 361' These events could also disseminate information and collect
feedback on potential and proposed disqualification reforms, as well as
create awareness for the current standards of recusal and a culture favorable
to improving them. 362
10. Special Recusal Bodies
Post- White, special committees have been created to monitor conduct
during judicial campaigns.363 These groups work best when they are
unofficial, by drawing attention to candidates' false or misleading campaign
assertions,'3 and ensuring accountability. 36  This concept can also be
implemented in recusal, by creating advisory recusal bodies that judges
would be encouraged to consult. 366 The advisory body would make public
any advice given and the judges' decisions to follow that advice or not, thus
creating public pressure on the judges to either follow the recommendations,
or to thoroughly explain their refusal to do so.367
358. Avery v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 547 U.S. 1003 (2006).
359. Goldberg, supra note 265, at 532.
360. Id.; see also Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court, 541 U.S. 913, 915-16 (2004) (mem. of Scalia, J.);
Laird v. Tatum, 409 U.S. 824, 837-38 (1972) (mem. of Rehnquist, J.).
361. See Sparling, supra note 288 and accompanying text; see also Goldberg, supra note 265, at
533.
362. Goldberg, supra note 265, at 533.
363. See Joseph E. Lambert, Contestable Judicial Elections: Maintaining Respectability in the
Post-White Era, 94 KY. L.J. 1, 13 (2005) (describing the work of such committees in Alabama,
Florida, Kentucky, and Ohio); see also Note, The Way Forward: Lessons from the National
Symposium on Judicial Campaign Conduct and the First Amendment, 35 IND. L. REV. 649, 655
(2002) (proposing the creation of conduct committees, both official and unofficial).
364. Goldberg, supra note 265, at 533.
365. Ensuring accountability is accomplished by informing the public on the amount and source
of campaign contributions that candidates receive.
366. Goldberg, supra note 265, at 533.
367. Id. at 533-34.
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D. What Else Can Be Done?
There should be longer terms for the judiciary because short terms
reduce judicial independence. 36 8 Longer terms translate into fewer elections
and campaigns, less need to raise funds, and fewer opportunities to make
political speeches that would create the appearance of partiality. 36 9  Of
course, longer terms run counter to the accountability that is the very reason
for having judicial elections,370 so we can expect to encounter significant
resistance to this proposal.
Increasing public outreach is another possibility. Educating the people
about the judicial system and its inner workings will increase the public's
confidence in the judicial system.371 California judges regularly talk to high
school students in a program called "Judges' Nights."372 The ABA's "Youth
Education for Citizenship" is another great program. 373
Educate voters in judicial elections. 4  Voter guides on judicial
candidates should be prepared and distributed by state and local
governments at no cost to candidates.7 California, Oregon, Washington,
Alaska, Colorado, North Carolina (only for appellate candidates), as well as
New York City, already send out voter guides. 7 6
Establish campaign conduct committees. Several states have followed
Justice Kennedy's advice in White that "all interested citizens can use their
own First Amendment freedoms to protest statements inconsistent with
standards of judicial neutrality and judicial excellence. Indeed, if democracy
is to fulfill its promise, they must do so."n377 Justice Stevens, although in
dissent in White, agreed on this point, suggesting that official bodies may
advise the voters when the candidates' statements make them incompatible
with the judicial position they seek.3 78 Such a committee in Ohio, started by
368. See Schotland, supra note 38, at 1099.
369. Id. at I100.
370. Pozen, supra note 38, at 285.
371. See Schotland, supra note 38, at I100.
372. Id.
373. Id.
374. However, as Judge Posner eloquently put it, "Most of what courts do is opaque to people
who are not lawyers. It is completely unrealistic to think that the average voter will ever know
enough about judicial performance to be able to evaluate judicial candidates intelligently. That is a
decisive objection to ... elect[ing] judges." Richard A. Posner, Judicial Autonomy in a Political
Environment, 38 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1, 5 (2006).
375. Summit, Call to Action: Statement of the National Summit on Improving Judicial Selection,
34 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 1353, 1357 (2001).
376. See Schotland, supra note 38, at 1101.
377. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 795 (2002) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
378. Id. at 797 (Stevens, J., dissenting). "If the solution to harmful speech must be more speech,
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the state bar, publicly decried the advertisements aired by non-candidates in
2002,' which led to a 2004 judicial election entirely free of such ads.38 o
Many such efforts, that do not involve recusal, may be seen as "band-
aids," but they are incremental improvements to secure judicial
independence in the world of judicial accountability.3 11
V. CONCLUSION
There is a need for disqualification reform in all jurisdictions, elective or
appointive. The United States Supreme Court has charted a narrow course
and has, so far, successfully navigated between a rock and a hard place,
shoring up judicial independence while preserving the rights of states to
have judicial elections. Case law develops slowly, which is why the Court
has encouraged the states and Congress to act. Fortunately, this is not a
zero-sum game, and the right to an impartial judge can be preserved and
strengthened. Several reform proposals have found favor in academia as
well as with the bench and the bar. The costs vary, but the benefits are well
known: impartial tribunals, justice, renewed confidence in the judiciary, and
due process protection for life and liberty.
Gabriel D. Serbulea*
so be it." Id.
379. Schotland, supra note 38, at 1103.
380. Id.
38 1. Id.
* J.D. Candidate 2011, Pepperdine University School of Law. Many thanks to Professor
Ogden for helping me get started on this endeavor. My appreciation also goes to Professor Pushaw
for finding the time to review my work and for helping me improve.
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APPENDIX: CONCISE REVIEW OF RECUSAL LAW IN THE FIFTY STATES AND
THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
Alabama
Alabama courts rarely found sufficient grounds to disqualify judges
before 1975,8 when the legislature enacted judicial disqualification
statutes. The statues required disqualification of judges who had an interest
in the case, were related to one of the parties, or had been of counsel in the
matter.383 The statutes also mandated that judges recuse themselves for the
appearance of impropriety if they had, as a judicial election candidate,
received substantial contributions from anyone involved with the case.3 In
1975, Alabama also adopted the Canons of Judicial Ethics which require, in
Canon 3(C), recusal not only for actual bias but also whenever absolute
impartiality cannot be guaranteed.3 "5  The Supreme Court of Alabama has
held Canon 3(C) to govern recusal and disqualification in the Alabama
courts.386 Alabama has partisan judicial elections and does not have
peremptory disqualification. 3
Alaska
While historically only direct interest in a pending case or a relationship
to the parties would disqualify judges in Alaska,8 the legislature changed
that in 1967 by granting parties the privilege to peremptorily disqualify
judges.8 Alaska judges can also be disqualified for cause,39 o including
actual bias or the appearance of bias.39' The disqualification basis for the
appearance of bias is strengthened by Alaska's Code of Judicial Conduct,
which asks judges to seriously consider the possible appearance of
382. See, e.g., Exparte White, 300 So. 2d 420 (Ala. Crim. App. 1974).
383. See Ex parte Jackson, 508 So. 2d 235 (Ala. 1987); see also Exparte Fowler, 863 So. 2d 1136
(Ala. Crim. App. 2001).
384. ALA. CODE § 12-24-1 (West, Westlaw through end of 2010 1st Special Sess.).
385. See Exparte Rives, 511 So. 2d 514, 517 (Ala. Civ. App. 1986).
386. Exparte Little, 837 So. 2d 822, 824 (Ala. 2002).
387. See generally AJS, Judicial Selection, supra note 112.
388. ALASKA Civ. CODE § 707(i) (1900), Act of June 6, 1900, ch. 70, 31 Stat. 321, 444.
389. ALASKA STAT. § 22.20.022 (1967); see also Moore v. State, 895 P.2d 507, 510 (Alaska Ct.
App. 1995); Feichtinger v. State, 779 P.2d 344, 347 (Alaska Ct. App. 1989).
390. ALASKA STAT. § 22.20.020 (West, Westlaw through 2010 2d Reg. Sess. of the 26th Legis.).
391. Perotti v. State, 806 P.2d 325, 327 (Alaska Ct. App. 1991). However, disqualification for the
appearance of bias places a greater burden on the moving party. See R.J.M. v. State, 946 P.2d 855
(Alaska 1997).
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impartiality. 392 Alaska has had a merit selection system for its judges since
it gained statehood. 9
Arizona
Arizona is one of the states that allow peremptory disqualification. In
noncapital criminal cases, the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure permit
each party one peremptory change of judge.394 The same Rules of Criminal
Procedure specify disqualification for cause.395 In civil cases, peremptory
disqualification,396 as well as for cause disqualification,9 is governed by
the Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure. Some disqualification for cause can
be brought under the Arizona Code of Judicial Conduct.9 It is the
challenged judge who decides issues of timeliness and waiver, after the
motion is filed.399 Arizona's judicial elections are non-partisan, followed by
retention.40
Arkansas
Arkansas's Constitution provides that judges cannot preside over trials
in which they have an interest or are related to any parties. 40 ' In 1973, the
Arkansas Supreme Court declared the state's Code of Judicial Conduct to be
the standard for judicial conduct.402  The Code looks for bias and the
appearance of bias as well. 403 Arkansas has non-partisan judicial elections
and does not allow peremptory challenges.40
392. See Keller v. State, 84 P.3d 1010 (Alaska Ct. App. 2004).
393. See generally AJS, Judicial Selection, supra note 112.
394. ARiz. R. CRIM. P. 10.2(a) (West, Westlaw through Jan. 1, 2011 legislation).
395. ARIZ. R. CRIM. P. 10.1.
396. ARIZ. R. Civ. P. 42(f)(1) (West, Westlaw through Jan. 1, 2011 legislation); see, e.g.,
Anderson v. Contes, 128 P.3d 239 (Ariz. Ct. App 2006); see also Brush Wellman, Inc. v. Lee, 996
P.2d 1248 (Ariz. App. 2000).
397. ARIz. R. Civ. P. 42(f)(2).
398. See Scheehle v. Justices of Supreme Court, 120 P.3d 1092 (Ariz. 2005).
399. Taliaferro v. Taliaferro, 921 P.2d 21, 23 (Ariz. 1996) (en banc); cf Williams v. Superior
Court, 945 P.2d 391, 393 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1997) ("[Wlaiver provisions ... are intended to prohibit a
party from peremptorily challenging a judge after discovering the judge's viewpoint on any
significant aspect of the case.").
400. See generally AJS, Judicial Selection, supra note 112.
401. ARK. CONST., amend. LXXX, § 12. Prior to its repeal in 2001, ARK. CONST. art. 7, § 20
provided the same grounds for judicial disqualification. See Lofton v. State, 944 S.W.2d 131 (Ark.
1997).
402. See Roe v. Dietrich, 835 S.W.2d 289, 292 (Ark. 1992); Turner v. State, 926 S.W.2d 843
(Ark. 1996).
403. ARK. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3 (West, Westlaw through Oct. 15, 2010
legislation); Holder v. State, 124 S.W.3d 439 (Ark. 2003) (quoting the Code's proposition that a
judge shall recuse when interested, and a judge must avoid all appearances of bias).
404. See generally AJS, Judicial Selection, supra note 112.
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California
The California Constitution requires disqualification of judges who have
been indicted or recommended for removal or retirement by the Commission
on Judicial Performance.405 However, it is the California Civil Procedure
Code that allows disqualification of judicial officers for cause 406 or
peremptorily. 407 Notably, the peremptory challenge right is viewed as "a
substantial right and an important part of California's system of due process
that promotes fair and impartial trials and confidence in the judiciary."408
The peremptory challenge section of the California Civil Procedure Code
applies to both civil and criminal cases.409 Unique in the nation is
California's Civil Procedure Code § 170.2, which specifies a list of
circumstances that are not bases for disqualification.4 10 California has non-
partisan judicial elections, followed by retention elections.4 11
Colorado
In civil cases, the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure govern
disqualification, 4 12 while in criminal cases both statutes413 and the Rules of
Criminal Procedure 4 14 apply. The Colorado Code of Judicial Conduct must
be taken into consideration by judges, when deciding disqualification
motions.415 Colorado is one of the few western states that does not have
peremptory challenges. Its judicial selection system is one based on merit,
but it does provide for subsequent retention elections.416
405. CAL. CONST., art. 6, § 18.
406. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 170.1-170.5 (West, Westlaw through 2010 Reg. Sess. laws; all
2009-2010 1st through 8th Ex. Sess. laws; and all Props. on 2010 ballots), which seem to parallel 28
U.S.C. § 455.
407. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 170.6.
408. Stephens v. Superior Court, 116 Cal. Rptr. 2d 616, 622 (Ct. App. 2002).
409. See, e.g., Le Louis v. Superior Court, 257 Cal. Rptr. 458 (Ct. App. 1989); Peracchi v.
Superior Court, 30 Cal. 4th 1245, 1248-49 (2003).
410. When the judge is a member of a racial, ethnic, religious, sexual, or other such group, and the
matter involves such a group's rights. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 170.2.
411. See generally AJS, Judicial Selection, supra note 112.
412. COLO. R. Civ. P. 97 (West, Westlaw through Mar. 1, 2011 legislation).
413. COLO. REv. STAT. § 16-6-201 (West, Westlaw through ch. 1-6 of the Ist Reg. Sess. of the
68th Gen. Assembly (2011)); see also People v. Taylor, 131 P.3d 1158, 1166-67 (Colo. Ct. App.
2005).
414. COLO. R. CRIM. P. 21(b) (West, Westlaw through Mar. 1, 2011 legislation); see also People
v. Rodriguez, 914 P.2d 230, 283 (Colo. 1996).
415. See People v. Julien, 47 P.3d 1194, 1197 (Colo. 2002) (en banc) (quoting the Code's
proposition that a judge should recuse if "impartiality might reasonably be questioned").
416. See generally AJS, Judicial Selection, supra note 112.
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Connecticut
A judicial disqualification statute has been part of Connecticut's legal
system since 1672.417 The current statute provides financial interests and
relationship to litigants as bases for disqualification.418 The state's Code of
Judicial Conduct requires, under Rule 2.11, that judges recuse themselves
for personal bias or when their impartiality might reasonably be
questioned.4 19 Connecticut does not have peremptory challenges and selects
its judges using a merit plan.420
Delaware
There are no statutes regarding judicial disqualification in Delaware-
one of few states in this situation.42 1 Judges are bound by the Delaware
Code of Judicial Conduct, which is very similar to the ABA version.422 The
Code, of course, includes the situation where impartiality might reasonably
be questioned.423 Delaware does not have peremptory disqualification and
its judiciary is selected using a merit selection system.424
District of Columbia
In the District of Columbia, judicial disqualification in civil cases
follows the D.C. Superior Court Rule of Civil Procedure 63-I.425 For
criminal cases, the courts follow the same rule.426 Alternatively, the ABA
Code of Judicial Conduct can be used as grounds for disqualifying judges in
417. See Petrowski v. Norwich Free Acad., 481 A.2d 1096, 1102 (Conn. 1984) (mentioning the
Connecticut General Statutes of 1672).
418. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 51-39 (West, Westlaw through Gen. Stat., Rev. 1-1-2011).
419. See CONN. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.11 (2011) (West, Westlaw through Feb. 1,
2011 legislation). Prior to the 2010 amendments, case law dealt with recusal under Canon 3(c). See
Abington Ltd. P'ship, v. Heublein, 717 A.2d 1232 (Conn. 1998) (personal bias); Sabatasso v. Hogan,
882 A.2d 719 (Conn. 2005) (impartiality reasonably questioned); see also State v. Eric M., 858 A.2d
767 (Conn. 2004) (stating "relevant ... is Canon 3(c)(1) of the Code").
420. See generally AJS, Judicial Selection, supra note 112.
421. FLAMM,supra note 6, §§ 26.1-26.2.
422. See DEL. JUDGES' CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (West, Westlaw through Dec. 1, 2011
legislation); DEL. SUP. CT. R. 84 (West, Westlaw through Dec. 1, 2011 legislation) (establishing the
Delaware Judges' Code of Judicial Conduct as the standard for Delaware judges).
423. See In re Wittrock, 649 A.2d 1053, 1054 (Del. 1994); Los v. Los, 595 A.2d 381, 383 (Del.
1991).
424. See generally AJS, Judicial Selection, supra note 112.
425. D.C. SUPER. CT. CIV. P. 63-1 (West, Westlaw through July 1, 2010 legislation). The rule has,
practically, the same content as the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 63, or 28 U.S.C. § 144. See
Browner v. D.C., 549 A.2d 1107, 1113 (D.C. Ct. App. 1987).
426. See D.C. SUPER. CT. R. CRIM. P. 57(a) (West, Westlaw through July 1, 2010 legislation).
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both civil and criminal trials.427  There are no peremptory recusals and
judges are appointed.428
Florida
The state supreme court has held that Florida Statute § 38.10 is
dispositive when deciding disqualification in the state. 4 29 The Florida Code
of Judicial Conduct may provide independent grounds for recusal.430 Judges
may not consider the truth of the facts alleged,4 31 but they must consider the
legal sufficiency of the claim. 4 32  There are no peremptory challenges.
Florida's appellate judges are selected using a merit-based system, while its
trial-level judges are selected in non-partisan elections.433
Georgia
Georgia statutes disqualify judges for pecuniary interest, for relationship
to parties, for having been of counsel in the matter, or for presiding over the
matter in a lower court.43" Other provisions are sometimes cited, but of
prevalent use is the Georgia Code of Judicial Conduct, which provides
broader bases for disqualification than any of its statutes.435 Judges were
prohibited from soliciting campaign contributions, offering public
endorsements, or making misleading statements until 2002 when a federal
court struck down those provisions.436 There is no peremptory
427. See, e.g., Belton v. United States, 581 A.2d 1205, 1213 n.8 (D.C. 1990).
428. See generally AJS, Judicial Selection, supra note 112.
429. See, e.g., Kokal v. State, 901 So. 2d 766 (Fla. 2005); see also Zuchel v. State, 824 So. 2d
1044, 1046 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
430. See, e.g., Kokal, 901 So. 2d 766; see also Fischer v. Knuck, 497 So. 2d 240, 242 (Fla. 1986).
431. See, e.g., Gates v. State, 784 So. 2d 1235, 1237 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001) ("The judge ...
erred when she attempted to refute the factual accuracy of the allegations."). But see Niebla v. State,
832 So. 2d 887, 888 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002) ("Although it is impermissible for a [udge] to refute
the charges in a motion to disqualify . .. a court is permitted to state the status of the record.").
432. See e.g., Randolph v. State, 853 So. 2d 1051, 1064 (Fla. 2003); see also McQueen v. Roye,
785 So. 2d 512, 514 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000) ("The function of the trial court is limited to a
determination of the legal sufficiency of an affidavit, without reference to its truth and veracity.").
433. See generally AJS, Judicial Selection, supra note 112.
434. See, e.g., In re A.H., 578 S.E.2d 247 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003); see also Bevil v. State, 467 S.E.2d
586, 588 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996).
435. See, e.g., Pope v. State, 354 S.E.2d 429, 431 (Ga. 1987); see also Gillis v. City of Waycross,
543 S.E.2d 423, 425 (Ga. 2000) ("[I]n 1982, the Supreme Court made clear that Canon 3E ...
provides 'a broader rule' . .. ."). But see Brannen v. Prince, 421 S.E.2d 76 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992)
(stating that Canons 2 and 3 are not the legal test).
436. Weaver v. Bonner, 309 F.3d 1312, 1321 (1lth Cir. 2002) ("[T]he distinction between judicial
elections and other types of elections has been greatly exaggerated, and we do not believe that the
1155
disqualification, and judges are initially appointed followed by contested
retention elections.437
Hawai'i
Hawai'i litigators use three sources of disqualification law:43 8
statutes, 439 the Hawai'i Code of Judicial Conduct,440 and case law. The
appearance of impropriety is one of the bases for disqualification."'
Hawai'i does not have peremptory challenges, and its judges are selected
using a merit system that stresses the importance of qualifications, not
political patronage.442
Idaho
Idaho judges can be disqualified under the Idaho Rules of Criminal
Procedure in criminal cases," 3 or under the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure
in civil cases."" In order to disqualify a judge, a party must show that the
judge has an interest in the pending case, is related to the parties, has been of
counsel in the matter, or is biased. While the Code of Judicial Conduct adds
the "impartiality might reasonably be questioned""' standard as a
disqualification basis, the decision itself is made by the challenged judge."6
Idaho has peremptory disqualifications,447 and uses non-partisan elections to
select its judges. 448
distinction, if there truly is one, justifies greater restrictions on speech during judicial campaigns
than during other types of campaigns.").
437. See generally AJS, Judicial Selection, supra note 112.
438. See generally Yorita v. Okumoto, 643 P.2d 820 (Haw. Ct. App. 1982).
439. HAW. REv. STAT. ANN. § 601-7(a) (West, Westlaw through 2010 Reg. and Special Sess.)
(providing disqualification for pecuniary interest, relationship to parties, being of counsel, or having
passed judgment on the matter in an inferior court).
440. See, e.g., State v. Brown, 776 P.2d 1182, 1187 (Haw. 1989).
441. See Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Au, 113 P.3d 203, 213-14 (Haw. 2005) (also stating
that the appearance of impropriety basis uses a reasonable person objective test).
442. See generally AJS, Judicial Selection, supra note 112.
443. IDAHO R. CRIM. P. 25(b) (West, Westlaw through June 15, 2010 legislation).
444. IDAHO R. Civ. P. 40(d)(2) (West, Westlaw through June 15, 2010 legislation).
445. IDAHO CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3(E)(1) (West, Westlaw through June 15, 2010
legislation).
446. See Gunter v. Murphy's Lounge, 105 P.3d 676 (Idaho 2005).
447. IDAHO R. Civ. P. 40(d)(1).
448. See generally AJS, Judicial Selection, supra note 112.
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Illinois
In Illinois, parties can seek disqualification for cause in both criminal" 9
and civil45 0 cases. The Illinois Code of Judicial Conduct is another source of
law in the disqualification arena, and its provisions are considered
mandatory.45 1 Its Canon 3 mandates that judges recuse themselves if their
impartiality might reasonably be questioned.452 The Illinois Code of
Criminal Procedure allows criminal defendants to remove a judge upon good
faith allegations of bias, 453 or peremptorily. 454  Illinois judges are initially
elected in partisan elections, followed by retention elections (unopposed).4 55
Indiana
At present, Trial Rule 79(C) governs the disqualification for cause in
Indiana.456 The rule requires recusal in accordance (and even references)
Canon 3(E) of the Code of Judicial Conduct.4 57 However, an original twist
on the matter is that only the Indiana Supreme Court can review alleged
Code violations, 458 and thus disqualification issues must ultimately reach the
high court.459 In criminal cases, both the defendant and the state may ask for
disqualification based upon bias under Indiana Criminal Rule 12(B). 46
Furthermore, Indiana allows peremptory challenges, pursuant to Trial Rule
76.461 Indiana's judiciary is selected through a wide variety of methods
449. See, e.g., People v. Jones, 757 N.E.2d 464 (Ill. 2001); see also People v. Flynn, 792 N.E.2d
527 (111. App. Ct. 2003).
450. See, e.g., Jacobs v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 683 N.E.2d 176, 180 (111. App. Ct. 1997).
451. See Woods v. Durkin, 539 N.E.2d 920, 922 (111. App. Ct. 1989); see also People v. Matthews,
562 N.E.2d 1113, 1140 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990).
452. See People v. Phinney, 620 N.E.2d 444, 446 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993).
453. ILL. CODE CRIM. P. § 114-5(a) (West, Westlaw through P.A. 96-1542 of the 2010 Reg.
Sess.); see also People v. Buck, 838 N.E.2d 187 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005).
454. ILL. CODE CRIM. P. § 114-5(c); see also People v. Nolan, 773 N.E.2d 105 (111. App. Ct.
2002).
455. See generally AJS, Judicial Selection, supra note 112.
456. Tri Lakes Reg'1 Sewer Dist. v. Geiger, 830 N.E.2d 890 (Ind. 2005).
457. See Hass v. State, 843 N.E.2d 994 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006).
458. See Carter v. Knox Cnty. Office of Family & Children, 761 N.E.2d 431, 434 (Ind. Ct. App.
2001) ("[B]ecause the Indiana Supreme Court has exclusive jurisdiction over alleged [Code of
Judicial Conduct violations] we cannot determine whether a trial court judge violated a Judicial
Canon.").
459. See Tri Lakes, 830 N.E.2d at 890.
460. See IND. R. CRIM. P. 12(B) (West, Westlaw through Jan. 1, 2011 legislation); see also
Flowers v. State, 738 N.E.2d 1051, 1059 (Ind. 2000).
461. IND. R. TRIAL P. 76(B) (West, Westlaw through Jan. 1 2011 legislation); see, e.g., Rose v.
Mercantile Nat'l Bank of Hammond, 844 N.E.2d 1035, 1047 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (applying Indiana
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from appointment, to non-partisan elections, to partisan elections.4 62  The
majority of trial-level courts are elected in partisan elections-excepting a
handful of counties which use merit or non-partisan elections.4 63  The
appellate courts are appointed.4 6
Iowa
In Iowa, judicial disqualification must be for cause,4 65 with the limited
bases provided for by statute: personal bias, personal knowledge of evidence
in the case, previously serving as a lawyer in the matter, financial interest in
the controversy, or relationship to the parties.466 While Iowa's Code of
Judicial Conduct has a provision for reasonably questioning impartiality,467
courts have continued to require actual bias.468 Iowa does not allow
peremptory disqualification. Its judges are selected using a merit-based
system, followed by retention elections.469
Kansas
Although Kansas does not have true peremptory challenges (without
showing of cause), it comes close in its statutory provisions by requiring-
upon filing of an affidavit, subsequent to the motion-that judges disqualify
themselves or immediately transfer the matter to another judge (the new
judge will rule on the affidavit's sufficiency). 47 0  Legal sufficiency is
attained only if the facts contained in the affidavit, if true, would support the
party's belief that the challenged judge will not preside over a fair trial.471
Kansas elections are non-partisan.472
Trial Rule 76(B)); see also Breitweiser v. Penrod, 775 N.E.2d 1175 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002).
462. See generally AJS, Judicial Selection, supra note 112.
463. See id
464. See id.
465. See State v. Lawrence, 344 N.W.2d 227, 230-31 (Iowa 1984).
466. IOWA CODE ANN. § 602.1606 (West, Westlaw through 2010 Reg. Sess.); see also In re Estate
of Olson, 479 N.W.2d 610, 613 (Iowa Ct. App. 1991).
467. IOWA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3(C) (West, Westlaw through Feb. 2, 2011
legislation).
468. See State v. Biddle, 652 N.W.2d 191, 198 (Iowa 2002) ("[Alctual prejudice must be
shown.").
469. See generally AJS, Judicial Selection, supra note 112.
470. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 20-311 d (West, Westlaw through 2010 Reg. Sess.); see also Logan v.
Logan, 937 P.2d 967, 977 (Kan. Ct. App. 1997).
471. See, e.g., State v. Alderson, 922 P.2d 435, 443 (Kan. 1996); see also State v. Goss, 777 P.2d
781, 788 (Kan. 1989).
472. See generally AJS, Judicial Selection, supra note 112.
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Kentucky
In Kentucky, the state's Code of Judicial Conduct, Supreme Court
Rules, Criminal Rules, and statutes all play a role. Litigants file motions
based on the statute, which mandates recusal for personal bias, for personal
knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts, or where the judge's impartiality
might reasonably be questioned.473 If the affidavit is sufficient on its face,
the challenged judge loses jurisdiction and the matter cannot proceed unless
a special judge is appointed or the Kentucky Supreme Court intervenes.474
Kentucky uses non-partisan elections for its judiciary and does not have
peremptory challenges.475
Louisiana
Several statutory provisions mandate judicial disqualification for cause
in Louisiana. In civil matters, article 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure and
the subsequent provisions govern,476 while article 671 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure and subsequent provisions govern the matter in criminal
cases. 477  A mere appearance of bias is not an accepted basis for
disqualification in either civil or criminal matters.478 Louisiana does not
have peremptory challenges and uses partisan elections for its judges.479
Maine
Statutorily, only defendants in civil suits may petition for a change of
judge in Maine,480 although case law has provided otherwise.48' Most of the
473. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 26A.015 (2)(a)-(e) (West, Westlaw through 2010 legislation); see
also Marlowe v. Commonwealth., 709 S.W.2d 424, 428 (Ky. 1986). Parties can also use KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 26A.020. See Mills v. Commonwealth, 170 S.W.3d 310 (Ky. 2005).
474. Jackson v. Commonwealth, 806 S.W.2d 643, 645 (Ky. 1991).
475. See generally AJS, Judicial Selection, supra note 112.
476. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 151 (West, Westlaw through 2010 Reg. Sess.). The statute
provides for recusal for prior participation (as an attorney or judge) in the case, for relationship to the
parties or their attorneys, etc. See Use v. Use, 654 So. 2d 1355, 1360-61 (La. Ct. App. 1995).
477. LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 671 (West, Westlaw through 2010 Reg. Sess.). The
criminal statute includes the grounds expounded in the civil statute and adds: bias or personal
interest, being a witness in the case, and inability-for any reason-to conduct a fair trial. See, e.g.,
State v. Brown, 874 So. 2d 318, 322 (La. Ct. App. 2004).
478. Brown v. Brown, 877 So. 2d 1228, 1238 (La. Ct. App. 2004) (stating that actual bias is
required).
479. See generally AJS, Judicial Selection, supra note 112.
480. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 1103 (West, Westlaw through 2009 2d Reg. Sess. of 124th
Legis.).
481. See In re Estate of Roach, 595 A.2d 433 (Me. 1991); see also Brendla v. Acheson, 554 A.2d
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jurisprudence touches upon known principles of disqualification (pecuniary
interest,482 extrajudicial source, 4 83 etc.). Maine does not have peremptory
challenges, and its judiciary is appointed.48
Maryland
Maryland's Constitution mandates recusal for interest, having been of
counsel in the matter, or relationship to the parties.4 85 Canon 3 of the
Maryland Code of Judicial Conduct is also used on frequent occasions.486
Court rules may also apply in some instances of judicial disqualification.4 87
Maryland does not have peremptory disqualification. Its judges are initially
appointed, and then they stand for either retention elections (appellate
judges) or non-partisan elections (judges for trial-level courts).488
Massachusetts
Article 29 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights guarantees state
citizens the right to be tried by impartial judges. 489  This right is
implemented in Rule 3:09 of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts 490
and in Canon 3 of the state's Code of Judicial Conduct. 49 1  Although a
"reasonable person" standard is used, the judges self-rule on their
impartiality. 49 2 Massachusetts does not have peremptory challenges. Since
1780, its judges have been appointed and receive life tenure; a 1972
constitutional amendment mandates retirement at the age of seventy.493
798 (Me. 1989).
482. City of Bangor v. Am. Fed'n of State, Cnty. & Mun. Emps., 449 A.2d 1129, 1137 (Me.
1982).
483. Barber v. Town of Fairfield, 486 A.2d 150, 152 (Me. 1985).
484. See generally AJS, Judicial Selection, supra note 112.
485. MD. CONST. art. IV, § 7; see also S. Easton Neighborhood Ass'n v. Town of Easton, 876
A.2d 58, 77-78 (Md. 2005); State v. Calhoun, 511 A.2d 461, 491 (Md. 1986).
486. Boyd v. State, 581 A.2d 1, 4-5 (Md. 1990); Wiseman v. State, 531 A.2d 1311, 1313 (Md.
1987).
487. Hernandez v. State, 672 A.2d 103, 105 (Md. 1996) (referring to Maryland Rule 4-406(b));
Surratt v. Prince George's Cnty., 578 A.2d 745, 758 (Md. 1990) (referring to Maryland Rule
P4(d)(2)); In re George G., 494 A.2d 247, 249 (Md. 1985) (referring to Maryland Rule 4-243(c)(5)).
488. See generally AJS, Judicial Selection, supra note 112.
489. See Harris v. Bd. of Trs. of State Coils., 542 N.E.2d 261, 269 (Mass. 1989).
490. Linkage Corp. v. Trs. of Bos. Univ., 679 N.E.2d 191, 201 (Mass. 1997).
491. See Parenteau v. Jacobson, 586 N.E.2d IS, 16-17 (Mass. App. Ct. 1992).
492. See, e.g., Fid. Mgmt. & Research Co. v. Ostrander, 662 N.E.2d 699, 705 (Mass. App. Ct.
1996).
493. See generally AJS, Judicial Selection, supra note 112.
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Michigan
Michigan's judicial disqualifications mostly arise under Michigan Court
Rule 2.003, which provides the following grounds: personal bias against a
party or attorney, personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts, has been
of counsel in the matter, has associated with counsel in the preceding two
years, has an economic interest in the case, is a party in the proceeding, or is
likely to be a material witness in the matter. 495 Actual bias can be used for
disqualification in Michigan,496 but the appearance of bias is not a valid
ground.497 Michigan does not have peremptory disqualification and has
non-partisan elections for its judges.498
Minnesota
The framework for disqualification in civil trial is provided in
Minnesota Statute § 487.40499 as well as § 542.16.'" Removal of judges in
criminal proceedings is provided by the Minnesota Rule of Criminal
Procedure 26.03.0 Minnesota allows for peremptory disqualification in
both civil5 0 2 and criminal cases. 0 3 Its judges are selected in non-partisan
elections.5" Minnesota used to prohibit judicial candidates from debating
their views on legal and political issues, from accepting political
endorsements, and from soliciting campaign contributions. The U.S.
Supreme Court in 2002 and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
in 2005 struck down these provisions as violations of the First
Amendment.o Since 2007, the state is undergoing an effort to change from
elections to an appointment system.506
494. Adair v. State, 709 N.W.2d 567 (Mich. 2006).
495. MICH. CT. R. 2.003(C) (West, Westlaw through June 1, 2010 legislation).
496. Id. at (C)(1)(a); see also Law Offices of Lawrence J. Stockler, P.C. v. Rose, 436 N.W.2d 70,
76-77 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989).
497. People v. Wells, 605 N.W.2d 374, 391 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999).
498. See generally AJS, Judicial Selection, supra note 112.
499. This statute mandates recusal for personal interest. See Berthiaume v. Berthiaume, 368
N.W.2d 328, 333 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985).
500. See In re Estate of Lange, 398 N.W.2d 569, 573 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986).
501. Hooper v. State, 680 N.W.2d 89, 92 (Minn. 2004).
502. MINN. R. Civ. P. 63.03 (West, Westlaw through Nov. 1, 2010 legislation); see also Zweber v.
Zweber, 435 N.W.2d 593, 594 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989).
503. MINN. R. CRIM. P. 26.03.14(3)-(6) (West, Westlaw through Nov. 1, 2010 legislation); see
also State v. Azure, 621 N.W.2d 721, 723 (Minn. 2001).
504. See generally AJS, Judicial Selection, supra note 112.
505. See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002) ("announce clause," which
prohibited candidates for judicial election from announcing their views on disputed legal or political
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Mississippi
Disqualification in Mississippi is found in the state constitution,o'
statutes,108 the Uniform Rules of Circuit and County Court Practice,so0 and
the state Code of Judicial Conduct.5 '0  The state's supreme court has held
that the Code provides the standard for recusal of Mississippi's judges.5si
Recusal is required if impartiality might reasonably be questioned.5 12
Mississippi does not have peremptory challenges and elects most of its
judges in non-partisan contests.1
Missouri
Missouri's judicial disqualification framework includes statutes, 514 as
well as the Missouri Code of Judicial Conduct.51" The appearance of
impartiality has been upheld as a basis for recusal.1  The right of a party to
disqualify a judge has been regarded as an important piece of Missouri's
court system.1 Peremptory disqualification is also permitted in civil
cases,518 as well as criminal matters.5 19 Judges are selected in a merit-based
plan-the Missouri Plan.520
issues, violated First Amendment); Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 416 F.3d 738, 765-66 (8th
Cir. 2005) ("solicitation clause," which prohibited candidates for judicial election from engaging in
specific partisan political activities and personally soliciting campaign contributions, violated First
Amendment).
506. See generally AJS, Judicial Selection, supra note 112.
507. MIss. CONST. art. 6, § 165; J.N.W.E. v. W.D.W., 922 So. 2d 12, 14 (Miss. Ct. App. 2005).
508. MISS. CODE ANN. § 9-1-11 (West, Westlaw through 2010 Reg., 1st & 2nd Extraordinary
Sess.).
509. See Miss. UNIF. R. CIR. & CNTY. CT. PRAC. 1.15 (West, Westlaw through Oct. 1, 2010).
Rule 1.15 requires recusal if impartiality might be questioned (by a reasonable person) and for other
reasons provided by the Mississippi Code of Judicial Conduct, or otherwise provided by law.
510. See Bryan v. Holzer, 589 So. 2d 648, 653 (Miss. 1991); cf Hill v. State, 919 So. 2d 142,
144-45 (Miss. Ct. App. 2005).
511. Hatchcock v. S. Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 912 So. 2d 844, 850 (Miss. 2005).
512. See Bredemeier v. Jackson, 689 So. 2d 770, 774 (Miss. 1997); King v. State, 897 So. 2d 981,
988 (Miss. Ct. App. 2004); cf Tubwell v. Grant, 760 So. 2d 687, 689 (Miss. 2000); Beckum v. State,
917 So. 2d 808, 816 (Miss. Ct. App. 2005).
513. See generally AJS, Judicial Selection, supra note 112.
514. See Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 545.660, 508.090, 508.140, 517.061 (West, Westlaw through the end
of the 2010 First Extraordinary Sess. of the 95th General Assembly); see also McPherson v. U.S.
Physicians Mut. Risk Retention Grp., 99 S.W.3d 462 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003); Nixon v. Dir. of
Revenue, 883 S.W.2d 945, 946-47 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994); State ex rel. Couch v. Stovall-Reid, 144
S.W.3d 895 (Mo. Ct. App. 2004).
515. See Moore v. Moore, 134 S.W.3d 110 (Mo. Ct. App. 2004).
516. State v. Jones, 979 S.W.2d 171, 178 (Mo. 1998); Williams v. Reed, 6 S.W.3d 916, 921-22
(Mo. Ct. App. 1999).
517. State ex rel. Stubblefield v. Bader, 66 S.W.3d 741, 742 (Mo. 2002). A liberal construction in
favor of this right is therefore mandated. Id; see also State v. Rulo, 173 S.W.3d 649, 651 (Mo. Ct.
App. 2005).
518. See, e.g., State ex rel. Hagler v. Seay, 907 S.W.2d 786, 787 (Mo. 1995); see also State v.
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Montana
Montana's constitutional right to a fair trial is also secured by statute.521
Peremptory challenges are allowed under the same statute. 522 Montana's
judiciary is elected in non-partisan elections.5 23
Nebraska
Nebraska's statutes providing for judicial recusal are seldom used,524
and so is the Nebraska Code of Judicial Conduct. 525 Nebraska courts tend to
use other states' jurisprudence in support of their disqualification
decisions.5 26  Nebraska does not have peremptory disqualification and its
judges are initially appointed with retention elections to folloW.5 27
Nevada
In general, Nevada's judiciary can be disqualified as provided by
statute,528 and the grounds include bias, being a party to the proceedings,
relationship to the parties, and being of counsel in the matter. The Nevada
Code of Judicial Conduct also provides bases for recusal,5 29 as does the due
process clause of the Nevada Constitution.3 0 Nevada permits, pursuant to
Athanasiades, 857 S.W.2d 337, 341 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993).
519. See State v. McElroy, 894 S.W.2d 180, 189 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995); State v. Hombuckle, 746
S.W.2d 580, 583-84 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988); see also MO. REV. STAT. § 517.061.
520. See generally AJS, Judicial Selection, supra note 112.
521. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 3-1-805 (West, Westlaw through all 2009 legislation) (providing
for disqualification for bias); see also Swan v. State, 130 P.3d 606, 610-11 (Mont. 2006).
522. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 3-1-804(1); see also Swan, 130 P.3d at 608; Wareing v.
Schreckendgust, 930 P.2d 37,49 (Mont. 1996); State v. Langford, 882 P.2d 490,495 (Mont. 1994).
523. See generally AJS, Judicial Selection, supra note 112.
524. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 24-739, 24-740, 24-315 (West, Westlaw through the 101st 2d Reg. Sess.
2010); see Gibilisco v. Gibilisco, 637 N.W.2d 898 (Neb. 2002). But see State v. Thomas, 685
N.W.2d 69 (Neb. 2004).
525. In re Estate of Odineal, 368 N.W.2d 800, 804 (Neb. 1985). But see State ex rel. Grape v.
Zach, 524 N.W.2d 788, 798 (Neb. 1994).
526. See State v. Barker, 420 N.W.2d 695, 699 (Neb. 1988).
527. See generally AJS, Judicial Selection, supra note 112.
528. NEv. REV. STAT. § 1.230 (West, Westlaw through the 2009 75th Reg. Sess. & 2010 26th
Special Sess. of the Nev. Legis. and technical corrections received from the Legis. Counsel Bureau)
(for all judges except for the Nevada Supreme Court justices); see also Scialabba v. Brandise Const.
Co., 921 P.2d 928, 932 n.2 (Nev. 1996). Nevada Supreme Court justices can be disqualified
pursuant to NEV. REV. STAT. § 1.225 and NEV. R. APP. P. 35 (West, Westlaw through Jan. 1, 2010
legislation); Towbin Dodge, LLC v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 112 P.3d 1063, 1068 (Nev. 2005).
529. See Towbin Dodge, 112 P.3d at 1067-68 (Nev. 2005)
530. See Ainsworth v. Combined Ins. Co. of Am., 774 P.2d 1003 (Nev. 1989).
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Nevada Supreme Court Rule 48.1(3), peremptory challenges.-"' Its judiciary
is selected through non-partisan elections; a recently proposed constitutional
amendment calls for a merit plan selection. 532
New Hampshire
The state constitution, Article 35, part 1, governs judicial
disqualification in New Hampshire.s3 3 While no statutes are on the books
regarding recusal, case law provides for disqualification for financial
interest, having knowledge of confidential evidence from prior proceedings,
relationship to parties, or having become entangled with a party in the
case.5 34 New Hampshire does not allow for peremptory challenges and its
judiciary is appointed at all levels.535
New Jersey
New Jersey has both statutes 3 . and court rules 37  forming the
framework of judicial recusal in the state. Occasionally courts have
referenced the New Jersey Code of Judicial Conduct, but have still required
a showing of prejudice or potential bias.3 New Jersey does not have
peremptory challenges and its judges are all appointed. 59
New Mexico
Peremptory disqualification, "excusal" in New Mexico, has been a part
of the state's law since 1851.540 Disqualification for cause can be achieved
under the state's constitution,5 4 1 for interest or relationship to parties, as well
as under New Mexico's Code of Judicial Conduct Rule 21-400,542 which
531. See, e.g., Hogan v. Warden, 916 P.2d 805, 807-08 (Nev. 1996); see also Panko v. Dist.
Court, 908 P.2d 706, 708 (Nev. 1995); Towbin Dodge, 112 P.3d at 1068.
532. See generally AJS, Judicial Selection, supra note 112.
533. See Appeal of Grimm, 692 A.2d 508, 510 (N.H. 1997); see also State v. Ayer, 834 A.2d 277,
296 (N.H. 2003).
534. See State v. Fennelly, 461 A.2d 1090, 1092 (N.H. 1983).
535. See generally AJS, Judicial Selection, supra note 112.
536. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:15-49 (West, Westlaw through L.2010, c. 123 (End) and J.R. No.
6); see also State v. Medina, 793 A.2d 68, 79-80 (N.J. Super Ct. App. Div. 2002).
537. State v. Sherman, 842 A.2d 859 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2004).
538. See State v. Marshall, 690 A.2d 1, 94 (N.J. 1997); see also State v. Harris, 859 A.2d 364,
434-35 (N.J. 2004).
539. See generally AJS, Judicial Selection, supra note 112.
540. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-3-9 (West, Westlaw through 2010 legislation); see Roberts v.
Richardson, 109 P.3d 765, 765-66 (N.M. 2005); see also In re Eastbum, 914 P.2d 1028, 1030 (N.M.
1996).
541. N.M. CONST., art. VI, § 18; see also State v. Fero, 732 P.2d 866, 869-70 (N.M. 1987); State
v. Williams, 730 P.2d 1196, 1201 (N.M. Ct. App. 1986).
542. N.M. CODE OF JUD. CoND. R. 21-400 (West, Westlaw through Aug. 1, 2010 legislation); see
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includes cases where "impartiality might reasonably be questioned."5 43 New
Mexico's judges are selected using a mix of merit system, partisan elections,
and retention elections. 544
New York
Judiciary Law § 14 controls judicial disqualification in New York.5 45
The recusal motion must be based on bias or appearance of bias, and will be
decided by the challenged judge. 546 Other sources have occasionally been
invoked for recusal: other statutory provisions, 547 New York court rules,548
and the New York Code of Judicial Conduct.5 49 The state of New York does
not have peremptory challenges and its judiciary is, in its entirety, selected
in partisan elections.55 0
North Carolina
Although North Carolina's only disqualification statute applies to
criminal cases,"' jurisprudence shows that civil cases are also afforded the
remedy.552 The ABA Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 3C was adopted in
1987, and was held to be-together with North Carolina General Statute
section 15A-1223-controlling in disqualification matters. 5 3  A judge
should recuse when impartiality could reasonably be questioned. 554 North
Martinez v. Carmona, 624 P.2d 54, 58-59 (N.M. Ct. App. 1980).
543. State v. Gonzales, 119 P.3d 151, 162 (N.M. 2005).
544. See generally AJS, Judicial Selection, supra note 112.
545. N.Y. JUDICIARY LAW § 14 (West, Westlaw through 2010 legislation). Judiciary Law § 14
prohibits a judge from sitting if interested in the matter. See In re Kila DD, 812 N.Y.S.2d 700, 701
(App. Div. 2006); Wash. Cnty. Cease, Inc. v. Persico, 465 N.Y.S.2d 965, 979 (Sup. Ct. 1983).
546. See, e.g., People v. Moreno, 516 N.E.2d 200 (N.Y. 1987); see also In re Murphy, 605
N.Y.S.2d 232, 234 (N.Y.A.D. 1993).
547. Flynn-Stallmer v. Stallmer, 563 N.Y.S.2d 207, 209 (App. Div. 1990) (stating that New
York's Family Court Act mandates disqualification if a judge has an interest in the case or is related
to any of the parties).
548. People v. Diaz, 498 N.Y.S.2d 698 (Cnty. Ct. 1986).
549. See Johnson v. Hornblass, 461 N.Y.S.2d 277, 279 (App. Div. 1983) (a judge is required to
avoid impropriety and the appearance thereof).
550. See generally AJS, Judicial Selection, supra note 112.
551. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1223 (West, Westlaw through 2010 legislation) (providing
mandatory recusal for a judge that cannot discharge judicial duties in an impartial manner); see also
State v. Scott, 471 S.E.2d 605, 612 (N.C. 1996).
552. Koufinan v. Koufman, 388 S.E.2d 207, 211 (N.C. Ct. App. 1990).
553. See State v. McRae, 594 S.E.2d 71 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004).
554. See State v. Scott, 471 S.E.2d at 613; see also In re Pedestrian Walkway Failure, 618 S.E.2d
819, 829-30 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005).
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Carolina does not have peremptory disqualification and uses non-partisan
elections for its judges.55
North Dakota
The North Dakota Code of Judicial Conduct governs judicial
disqualification for bias in the state.5 16  North Dakota also allows
peremptory challenges.5 North Dakota's judiciary is selected through non-
partisan elections. 58
Ohio
In general, disqualifying the judges of Ohio's Court of Common Pleas is
done pursuant a statute.559  However, the Ohio Constitution 60 gives the
chief justice of the Ohio Supreme Court the authority (and the exclusive
jurisdiction)5 61 to determine the disqualification of a judge on the Court of
Common Pleas. Because of this exclusivity and the absence of review of the
chief justice's decisions in disqualification matters, parties have alleged
violations of the U.S. Constitution's Due Process Clause in Ohio cases562
unsuccessfully. The Ohio Canons of Judicial Ethics are considered
mandatory for the entire Ohio judiciary and include the appearance of bias
as one of the grounds for recusal. 63  Ohio does not have peremptory
disqualifications and uses non-partisan elections for its judiciary. 56
Oklahoma
The right of every Oklahoma citizen to have an impartial judge at his or
her proceeding is enshrined in the state's constitution. 65  Statutory
555. See generally AJS, Judicial Selection, supra note 112.
556. N.D. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3 (West, Westlaw through Feb. 1, 2010
legislation); see also State v. Murchison, 687 N.W.2d 725 (N.D. 2004).
557. See City of Fargo v. Habiger, 682 N.W.2d 300, 303 (N.D. 2004) (noting that following the
procedure in North Dakota's Century Code § 29-15-21, a party may request a new judge in the
matter); see also State v. Stockert, 684 N.W.2d 605, 610-11 (N.D. 2004).
558. See generally AJS, Judicial Selection, supra note 112.
559. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2701.03 (West, Westlaw through 2010 legislation) (providing for
judicial disqualification for bias); see also State v. Woods, 2006 Ohio App. LEXIS 1218, at *10 (Ct.
App. Mar. 23, 2006).
560. OHIo CONsT. art. IV, § 5(C).
561. See, e.g., State v. DeSellems, No. 2004-L-057, 2005 Ohio App. LEXIS 3931, at *11 (Aug.
19, 2005); see also Goddard v. Children's Hosp. Med. Ctr., 751 N.E.2d 1062, 1066 (Ohio Ct. App.
2000).
562. Bland v. Graves, 650 N.E.2d 117, 124, 124-25 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994).
563. See, e.g., Clemons v. Hafner, No. 04 MA 162, 2005 Ohio App. LEXIS 4102, at *4 (Aug. 22,
2005); see also James v. James, 656 N.E.2d 399,404 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995).
564. See generally AJS, Judicial Selection, supra note 112.
565. OKLA. CONST. art. 2, § 6; see also Black v. State, 21 P.3d 1047, 1056 (Okla. Crim. App.
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provisions spell out the bases for recusal, such as interest in the case, 67
relationship to parties,s6 s and bias.569 Oklahoma has also adopted and
codified the Code of Judicial Conduct, which requires disqualification when
impartiality might reasonably be questioned.170  A party may ask for a re-
hearing of a denied recusal motion before the county's chiefjudge.57 ' There
are no peremptory challenges in Oklahoma and the state's judges are
selected using a merit system (appellate judges) or non-partisan elections
(trial judges).572
Oregon
Oregon has extensive disqualification statutes, which include
peremptory challenges." Oregon uses a mix of appointments, retention,
and non-partisan elections to select its judges.574
Pennsylvania
Pennsylvania's Code of Judicial Conduct mandates recusal for both
impropriety and its appearance. 75  A litigant may file a "plea of prejudice"
with the judge trying the case,176 who will decide whether to recuse himself
or herself-a decision that will not be reversed unless an abuse of discretion
2001).
566. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20 § 1401 (West, Westlaw through ch. 479 (End) of the 2d Reg. Sess.
of the 52nd Legis. 2010).
567. See Black, 21 P.3d at 1057.
568. Holloway v. Hopper, 852 P.2d 711, 712 (Okla. 1993).
569. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20 § 1401(c).
570. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, ch. 1, app. 4, Canon 3(E) (West, Westlaw through Dec 1, 2010
legislation).
571. Ward v. Ward, 895 P.2d 749, 751 (Okla. Civ. App. 1995).
572. See generally AJS, Judicial Selection, supra note 112.
573. OR. REV. STAT. §§ 14.210-14.275, 46.141 (West, Westlaw through 2010 legislation); see
also In re Kluge, 66 P.3d 492, 502-03 (Or. 2002); State ex rel. Ray Wells, Inc. v. Hargreaves, 761
P.2d 1306, 1307 (Or. 1988); Hanson v. Or. Dept. of Revenue, 653 P.2d 964, 966 (Or. 1982); State v.
Hilbom, 692 P.2d 1383, 1384 (Or. Ct. App. 1984), rev'd on other grounds, 705 P.2d 192 (Or. 1985).
574. See generally AJS, Judicial Selection, supra note 112.
575. PA. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Cannons 1-7 (West, Westlaw through Feb 18, 2011
legislature); see Mun. Publ'ns, Inc. v. Court of Common Pleas, 489 A.2d 1286, 1289-90 (Pa. 1985);
see also Commonwealth v. Fisher, 681 A.2d 130, 135 (Pa. 1996); Commonwealth v. Miller, 664
A.2d 1310, 1321 (Pa. 1995).
576. Rohm and Haas Co. v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 732 A.2d 1236, 1261 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1999) (citing In
re Crawford's Estate, 160 A.2d 585, 587 (Pa. 1931)).
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is found.s There are no peremptory challenges in Pennsylvania, and its
judiciary is elected in partisan elections.17 1
Rhode Island
Although Rhode Island's Code of Judicial Conduct (which includes the
appearance of bias basis) is cited by state cases as the authority in
disqualification matters,17 1 the Rhode Island Supreme Court, in its sparse
jurisprudence, seems to require actual bias. 8 o Rhode Island does not have
peremptory disqualification and selects its judges through a merit-based
system. 581
South Carolina
Although the South Carolina Code of Judicial Conduct calls for
disqualification when "impartiality might reasonably be questioned,"582 case
law has shown that proof of bias is required. 8 1 Statutes also mandate
disqualification for interest, for having been of counsel in the matter,584 or
for relationship to the parties.185  South Carolina does not have peremptory
challenges and its judges are appointed by the legislature.8
South Dakota
The South Dakota Supreme Court has stated that the right to disqualify a
judge is statutory and not constitutional-"except as it may be implicit in a
right to a fair trial." 87 Although the South Dakota Code of Judicial Conduct
provides for recusal when impartiality might reasonably be questioned, the
decision to do so is at the discretion of the challenged judge. South
577. Commonwealth v. Druce, 848 A.2d 104, 108 (Pa. 2004).
578. See generally AJS, Judicial Selection, supra note 112.
579. See State v. Lead Indus. Ass'n., 2005 R.I. Super. LEXIS 127, at *8-9 (R.I. Super. Ct. 2005).
580. See Kelly v. R.I. Pub. Transit Auth., 740 A.2d 1243, 1246 (R.I. 1999) (recognizing the
tension and required balance between two equally important principles: obligation to recuse oneself
if unable to render impartial decision versus obligation not to recuse oneself if there is no sound
reason to do it).
581. See generally AJS, Judicial Selection, supra note 112.
582. S.C. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3(e) (West, Westlaw through Dec. 15, 2010
legislation); see also Roche v. Young Bros., Inc., 504 S.E.2d 311, 316 (S.C. 1998); Christensen v.
Mikell, 476 S.E.2d 692, 694 (S.C. 1996).
583. Parker v. Shecut, 531 S.E.2d 546, 566 (S.C. Ct. App. 2000), rev'd on other grounds, 562
S.E.2d 620 (S.C. 2002); see also Patel v. Patel, 599 S.E.2d 114, 118 (S.C. 2004) (stating that a
judge's refusal to disqualify will not be reversed if there is no evidence of bias).
584. S.C. CODE ANN. 1976 § 14-8-70 (West, Westlaw through 2010 Reg. Sess.).
585. S.C. CODE ANN. 1976 § 14-2-130.
586. See generally AJS, Judicial Selection, supra note 112.
587. See State v. Hoadley, 651 N.W.2d 249, 257 (S.D. 2002).
588. Id
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Dakota has peremptory challenges.589 The Supreme Court justices of South
Dakota are appointed, while the rest of the judges are elected in non-partisan
elections.5ss
Tennessee
Tennessee's Constitution guarantees a fair tribunal to every state
citizen, 59' and it is one of the very few states that have held that "[a] fair trial
in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process." 592  The state
constitution (and a statute) also provides the grounds for disqualification:
interest in the case, relationship to the parties, having been of counsel in the
matter, or having presided over previous proceedings. 93  The Tennessee
Code of Judicial Conduct includes as a ground for disqualification a
situation where the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned,594
but the decision is committed to the judge's discretion."' Tennessee does
not have peremptory disqualifications and uses a hybrid system of merit
selection and partisan elections for its judiciary. 96
Texas
The Texas Constitution mandates disqualification for interest in the
case, relationship to the parties, or for having been of counsel in the
matter,597 but not for bias.59' Notably, a Texas trial judge does not have to
recuse sua sponte.599 In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the Texas legislature
589. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 15-12-21, 15-12-22 (West, Westlaw though the 2010 Reg. Sess.,
2010 general election, and Sup. Ct. R. 10-07); see also State v. Chamley, 568 N.W.2d 607, 619 (S.D.
1997); State v. Tapio, 432 N.W.2d 268, 270-71 (S.D. 1988).
590. See generally AJS, Judicial Selection, supra note 112.
591. See generally TENN. CONST. art. I § 17.
592. Henderson v. State, 2005 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 667, at *71 (Tenn. Crim App. 2005).
593. TENN. CONST., art. VI, § 11; see also TENN. CODE ANN. 17-2-101 (West, Westlaw through
end of 2010 First Ex. Sess. and 2010 Reg. Sess.); Yeubanks v. Methodist Healthcare Memphis
Hosp., 2004 Tenn. App. LEXIS 808, *10 (Ten. App. 2001).
594. See TENN. SUP. CT. R. 10, Canon 3(e) (West, Westlaw through Dec. 1, 2010); Davis v.
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 38 S.W.3d 560, 564-65 (Tenn. 2001).
595. See TENN. Canon 3(e); see also Davis v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 38 S.W.3d 560, 564-65
(Tenn. 2001).
596. See generally AJS, Judicial Selection, supra note 112.
597. TEX. CONST. art. V, § 11; see also McDuffie v. State, 854 S.W.2d 195, 201 (Tex. App.
1993).
598. See Stafford v. State, 948 S.W.2d 921, 924 (Tex. App. 1997).
599. Hall v. Treon, 39 S.W.3d 722, 723 (Tex. App. 2001).
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enacted a plethora of statutes regarding disqualification. oo In 1981, the
Texas Supreme Court adopted Rule 18 as part of the Texas Rules of Civil
Procedure. The rule provides the procedure to be followed for motions of
recusal. If the procedure is correctly observed, the challenged judge must
either recuse himself or herself, or request the assignment of another judge
to decide the motion.60 ' Because Texas has two courts of last resort6 02 -the
supreme court, which hears only civil matters, and the Court of Criminal
Appeals-it was not easily settled if Rule 18 applied to criminal cases.
Texas courts have split over the issue, only recently to resolve the matter in
favor of using Rule 18 in both civil and criminal cases.o 3 In 1987, the
legislature enacted section 74.053 of the Texas Government Code, which is
peremptory in nature, with a Texas twist: it deals with disqualification of
"visiting judges,"'6  be they "regular judges," 605 "retired judges," or "former
judges."606 The Texas judiciary is selected in partisan elections.0 7
Utah
Utah statutes require recusal for interest in the case, relationship to
parties, or for having been an attorney in the case.608  Two court ruleS6 09
clarify that the challenged judge has only two options: to recuse or to submit
the matter to another judge.6 10 Utah is one of the several western states with
no peremptory disqualifications, and its judges are primarily selected on
merit.611
600. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 30.01 (West, Westlaw through 2009 Reg. & 1st Called
Sess. of the 81st Legis.) (criminal cases); TEX. Gov'T CODE § 74.059 (West, Westlaw through 2009
Reg. & 1st Called Sess. of the 81st Legis.) (disqualification of Texas District Court judges); TEX.
Gov'T CODE § 26.011 (judges in criminal and non-probate cases); TEX. Gov'T CODE § 25.00255
(probate judges).
601. Johnson v. Pumjani, 56 S.W.3d 670, 672-73 (Tex. App. 2001).
602. See generally AJS, Judicial Selection, supra note 112.
603. See Crawford v. State, 807 S.W.2d 597, 598 (Tex. App. 1991). But see Dickerson v. State,
87 S.W.3d 632, 642 (Tex. App. 2002).
604. See Logic Sciences, Inc. v. Smith, 798 S.W.2d 394, 395 (Tex. App. 1990). But see Tex.
Emp't Comm'n v. Alvarez, 915 S.W.2d 161, 165-66 (Tex. App. 1996).
605. A current judicial officer from another court. TEX. GOv'T CODE ANN. § 74.054(a)(1); see
also Oilwell Control Services, Inc. v. PI Energy Corp., 24 S.W.3d 548, 551 (Tex. App. 2000).
606. TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 74.054; see also Mitchell Energy Corp. v. Ashworth, 943 S.W.2d
436 (Tex. 1997).
607. See generally AJS, Judicial Selection, supra note 112.
608. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78A-2-222 (West, Westlaw through 2010 legislation); see also Reg'1
Sales Agency, Inc. v. Reichert, 830 P.2d 252, 255 (Utah 1992); Madsen v. Prudential Fed. Say. &
Loan Ass'n, 767 P.2d 538, 544 (Utah 1988); Am. Plural Cellular, Inc., v. Systems Comm. Corp.,
939 P.2d 185, 194-95 (Utah App. 1997).
609. UTAH R. CRIM. P. 29 (West, Westlaw through 2010 legislation); UTAH R. Civ. P. 63(b)
(West, Westlaw through 2010 legislation); see also In re Affidavit of Bias, 947 P.2d 1152, 1153 n.2
(Utah 1997); State v. O'Neil, 848 P.2d 694, 696 n.l (Utah App. 1993).
610. See State v. Ontiveros, 835 P.2d 201, 204 (Utah App. 1992).
611. See generally AJS, Judicial Selection, supra note 112.
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Vermont
While the tradition in Vermont has been self-recusal,612 both the Rules
of Civil613 and Criminal614 Procedure have entered the fray requiring an
administrative judge to hear motions to disqualify in civil cases,615 and that
an affidavit or certificate accompany the motion for criminal cases.616 Also,
the Code of Judicial Conduct mandates disqualification whenever
impartiality might reasonably be questioned.617 There are no peremptory
challenges in Vermont and its judges are appointed.
Virginia
Although Virginia has adopted the Code of Judicial Conduct, 619
including its provision for appearance of bias,620 the Virginia Supreme Court
has held that a Code violation does not automatically result in
disqualification; rather, the party needs to prove bias.621 Virginia does not
have peremptory challenges and its judges are appointed by the
legislature.622
Washington
Canon 3D of the Washington Code of Judicial Conduct requires judges
to recuse themselves for bias or whenever impartiality might reasonably be
questioned.623 Judicial disqualification in Washington is also provided for
by statute and can be for cause624 or peremptory.625 Washington's judges
are elected in non-partisan elections.626
612. See Perrott v. Johnston, 562 A.2d 459, 461 (Vt. 1989).
613. VT. R. Civ. P. 40(e) (West, Westlaw through 2010 legislation).
614. VT. R. CRIM. P. 50(d)(2) (West, Westlaw through 2010 legislation).
615. See State v. Dann, 702 A.2d 105, 115 (Vt. 1997); see also Ball v. Melsur Corp., 633 A.2d
705, 710 (Vt. 1993); Klein v. Klein, 572 A.2d 900, 903 (Vt. 1990).
616. State v. Carter, 577 A.2d 280, 281 (Vt. 1990).
617. VT. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3 (West, Westlaw through Adjourned Sess. of the
2009-2010 Gen. Assembly (2010)); see also Dann, 702 A.2d at 115.
618. See generally AJS, Judicial Selection, supra note 112.
619. See VA. CANONS OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (West, Westlaw through Oct. 1, 2010).
620. Wilson v. Commonwealth, 617 S.E.2d 431, 441 (Va. App. 2005), rev'd 630 S.E.2d 326 (Va.
2006).
621. Commonwealth v. Jackson, 590 S.E.2d 518 (Va. 2004); see also Wilson, 617 S.E.2d at 441.
622. See generally AJS, Judicial Selection, supra note 112.
623. Finn Hill Masonry, Inc. v. Dept. of Labor & Indus., 116 P.3d 1033, 1034 (Wash. Ct. App.
2005).
624. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.12.040 (West, Westlaw through 2011 legislation).
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West Virginia
Modem West Virginia law concerning disqualification is governed by
Canon 3(E) of the state's Code of Judicial Conduct 627  and its
implementation in court rules.628 Once the motion is filed, the challenged
judge must step aside and the motion is decided by the presiding judge or the
chief justice of the Supreme Court of Appeals.629 There are no peremptory
disqualifications, and its judges have been elected in partisan manner since
statehood in 1862.630
Wisconsin
Although Wisconsin has adopted the Code of Judicial Ethics, a violation
thereof will not disqualify a judge.63' Rather, disqualification is mandatory
when statutory conditions are met: relationship to parties or counsel, being a
party or material witness, having previously been of counsel, having
previously presided over the case, interest in the matter, bias, or the
appearance of bias.632 Wisconsin statutes also allow peremptory challenges
in both civil 633 and criminal cases. 634 Non-partisan judicial elections are the
norm in Wisconsin.
Wyoming
Statutes provide for disqualification for cause in Wyoming,636 using a
reasonable person standard.6 The state's Code of Judicial Conduct can
also be used. 3 Most importantly, Wyoming allows for peremptory
625. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.12.050; see also Harbor Enter., Inc. v. Gudjonsson, 803 P.2d
798, 800 (Wash. 1991); State v. Waters, 971 P.2d 538, 541 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999).
626. See generally AJS, Judicial Selection, supra note 112.
627. Arneault v. Arneault, 605 S.E.2d 590, 596-97 (W. Va. 2004).
628. W. VA. TRIAL COURT RULES 17.01-.08 (West, Westlaw through 2009 legislation); see also
State ex rel. E.I. Dupont De Nemours & Co. v. Hill, 591 S.E.2d 318 (W. Va. 2003).
629. State ex rel. Pritt v. Vickers, 588 S.E.2d 210 (W. Va. 2003); see also State ex rel. Myers v.
Painter, 576 S.E.2d 277 (W. Va. 2002).
630. See generally AJS, Judicial Selection, supra note 112.
631. State v. Carviou, 454 N.W.2d 562 (Wis. Ct. App. 1990).
632. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 757.19 (West, Westlaw through 2009 legislation); see City of Edgerton v.
Gen. Cas. Co. of Wis., 527 N.W.2d 305, 307 (Wis. 1995); see also State v. Smith, 2004 Wis. App.
LEXIS 477, *15-16 (2004).
633. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 801.58; see also State ex rel. Mateo v. Cir. Court for Winnebago Cnty,
696 N.W.2d 275, 277-78 (Wis. Ct. App. 2005).
634. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 971.20; see also State ex rel. Mace v. Circ. Court for Green Lake Cnty.,
532 N.W.2d 720, 722 (Wis. 1995).
635. See generally AJS, Judicial Selection, supra note 112.
636. WYo. R. Civ. P. 40.1(b)(2) (West, Westlaw through 2010 legislation).
637. See Mace v. Nocera, 101 P.3d 921 (Wyo. 2004).
638. Counts v. State, 899 P.2d 1341 (Wyo. 1995).
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disqualification in civil suits63 9 as well as criminal trials.640  Most of
Wyoming's judges are selected using a merit-based process and later stand
for retention elections.i'
639. WYo. R. Civ. P. 40.1(b); see also Olsten Staffing Serv., Inc. v. D.A. Stinger Serv., Inc., 921
P.2d 596, 597 (Wyo. 1996).
640. WYo. R. CRIM. P. 21.1 (West, Westlaw through 2010 legislation) (divesting the challenged
judge of jurisdiction and requiring the assignment of the case to another judge).
641. See generally AJS, Judicial Selection, supra note 112.
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